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ABSTRACT 
 
Poverty, Solidarity, and Opportunity:  The 1938 San Antonio Pecan Shellers’ Stirke.  
(December 2007) 
Matthew Jerrid Keyworth, B.A., University of Houston 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. David Vaught 
 
 In 1938, San Antonio’s pecan shellers waged a five-week strike against their 
employers.  The shellers had few resources at their disposal, and, moreover, most of 
them were Mexican women.  During the work stoppage, the picketers endured 
widespread opposition and police brutality.  Nonetheless, the shellers forced their 
employers to arbitrate.  Previous scholars have characterized the strike as spontaneous, 
but closer examination reveals the events and circumstances that spurred the shellers to 
action.  Specifically, this work will address why the strike occurred at the beginning of 
1938, and how the shellers achieved a successful outcome. 
Political and economic factors in the early twentieth century resulted in a 
massive wave of migration from Mexico into the U.S.  Newly arrived Mexican workers 
faced discrimination in the workplace and in their personal lives.  That discrimination 
resulted in low wages for Mexican workers.  Low wages forced Mexicans in San 
Antonio to live in the city’s west side neighborhood, which lacked adequate housing and 
infrastructure.  Such conditions gave pecan workers considerable reason to resent their 
employers and seek change. 
 iv
Grievances alone might explain why the shellers struck, but they do not explain 
the strike’s success.  Pecan workers relied on solidarity formed over many years to 
sustain their work stoppage until their employers surrendered.  Solidarity was formed in 
a variety of venues on the west side, in both formal and informal organizations.  Leisure 
activities also fostered unity, often along cultural lines.  The shellers also built a sense of 
togetherness through labor organizations and mutual aid societies. 
The political climate in San Antonio during the late 1930s provided the final 
piece to the puzzle of the strike’s success.  Election results at the federal, state, and local 
levels signaled that voters sought the leadership of individuals who advocated increased 
rights for workers and minorities.  The shellers seized on the political climate, waging 
their strike at a time when it stood a better than average chance to succeed.  Without the 
combination of poverty, solidarity, and opportunity that existed for Mexicans on the 
west side in January 1938, the strike’s occurrence and outcome would have been in 
considerable doubt. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 On February 23, 1938, Maria Hernandez sat on her porch with her sisters and 
watched San Antonio’s police force descend upon hundreds of striking pecan shellers 
who picketed in the street.1  Tear gas filled the strikers’ lungs while they gasped for 
fresh air, a task complicated by the bevy of police batons that pummeled their 
defenseless bodies.  Terror seized the Hernandez sisters as their attention turned from t
horrific scene before them toward a contingent of officers marching in their direction.  
Paralyzed with fear, the women remained on their stoop until forced to the ground
their uniformed captors.  “If you resist,” one officer screamed, “we’ll split your head!” 
An additional warning of indefinite incarceration further discouraged the women from 
supporting the strike.  The latter threat rivaled the first, as each woman knew that pecan 
workers already filled the city’s jails well beyond capacity and that the facility had 
degenerated into a filthy, disease-ridden, Tejano repository.
he 
 by 
 
                                                
2 
 Three weeks earlier, the city’s shellers walked off the job when their employers 
instituted a one-cent per-pound pay cut.  Local labor leader Emma Tenayuca had been 
organizing the shellers for several months, and her passionate speeches roused the 
workers to action.  City leaders attempted to discourage the strike and undermine 
 
This thesis follows the format and style of the Southwest Historical Quarterly. 
 
1 The term pecan sheller will be used interchangeably with the term pecan worker.  About 90 percent of 
workers were shellers.  Crackers and washers constituted the remainder of workers, and they also partook 
in the strike.  Moreover, the term Mexican will refer to Mexican Americans, as that was the most common 
term used at the time for that population.  Additionally, Mexican will be used interchangeably with 
Latino/a and Tejano/a.  The term Mexican national will refer to citizens of Mexico.  The term Anglo will 
refer to all non-Hispanic whites, regardless of ethnicity. 
2 San Antonio Express, 24 February 1938; La Prensa, 24 February 1938. 
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Tenayuca’s leadership in the opening days of the work stoppage, but police violence 
ensued when peaceful measures failed to produce a resolution.  The workers came under 
daily attack from police chief Owen Kilday’s officers, but they also received an infusion 
of support from the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO).  As CIO organizers took 
control of the strike, they asked Governor James V. Allred to send Texas Rangers to 
protect the shellers from Kilday’s police force.  The governor refused that request, but 
assisted the workers by establishing a committee to consider their grievances and 
pressuring the municipal government to end police abuses.   
The strike hobbled into its fourth week as the Hernandez sisters succumbed to 
arrest.  The Texas Civil Liberties Union had already declared that there was “no blacker 
page in the entire history of Civil Liberties in the United States than the story of the San 
Antonio Pecan Shellers’ Strike,” and the brutal tactics employed by Kilday’s officers to 
end picketing corroborated that conclusion.3  Yet, the strike continued.  In mid-March, 
after thirty-seven days of intense confrontations between the estimated 12,000 shellers 
and local law enforcement, the city’s pecan workers and their employers agreed to 
arbitration.  Both sides claimed victory at the arbitration board’s decisions.  Just as it 
seemed that the workers had achieved some measure of equality in bargaining with their 
employers, however, the newly mandated federal minimum wage significantly changed 
the shelling industry in San Antonio.4 
                                                 
3 Texas Civil Liberties Union, San Antonio – The Cradle of Texas Liberty, and Its Coffin? (Austin:  Texas 
Civil Liberties Union, 1938), 8. 
4 La Prensa, 9 March 1938;  San Antonio Express, 10 March 1938. 
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The strike’s success raises several important questions.  What sorts of grievances 
prodded the shellers to action?  Why were San Antonio’s pecan workers all Mexican, 
and what other employment opportunities did they have in the city?  How did the strikers 
manage to sustain the work stoppage given their lack of resources?  What reason did 
shellers have to believe the public might be sympathetic to their strike in early 1938?  
Was the strike merely a spontaneous reaction to the wage cut implemented by the 
industry or the result of more profound circumstances and processes?  And why did the 
strike occur precisely at this time, and not earlier? 
 The pecan shellers’ grievances stemmed from numerous inequalities both inside 
and outside of the workplace.  Many of the industry’s workers came to Texas from 
Mexico as part of a great wave of migration between 1910 and 1930.  Political turmoil in 
Mexico drove people out of the country, and abundant jobs in the railroads and 
agriculture attracted them to Texas.  Mexican wage laborers quickly displaced poor 
white sharecroppers in South Texas, but they paid a significant social price, as Anglos 
refused to accept them as equals.  Jim Crow laws did not technically apply to Tejanos, 
but white attitudes almost universally relegated them to poorly paying jobs that offered 
few opportunities for advancement.   
For geographic, cultural, and economic reasons, San Antonio became a 
destination for thousands of Mexicans seeking more stable work, and possibly more 
equal treatment, in an urban area.  Although jobs abounded, most were in the city’s low-
paying light manufacturing sector.  Those wages condemned the city’s Tejanos to 
tenements on the west side, which lacked sufficient electrical, water, and sewage 
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services.  Diseases thrived in the underdeveloped neighborhood and infant mortality 
rates soared.  Inadequate educations received in segregated schools further handicapped 
Mexicans seeking to improve their circumstances.  As the Great Depression set in, the 
situation became even more bleak as competition for jobs increased and wages 
plummeted. 
Despite such harsh conditions, Tejanos in San Antonio sought to improve their 
lives through group action.  Institutions such as the Catholic Church allowed many 
Mexicans to practice organizing and leadership skills and incubated solidarity formation 
among members.  Some used those experiences to form advocacy groups that appealed 
to the city on behalf of west side residents.  Others formed labor unions that looked to 
secure better pay and working conditions from the city’s employers.  Unity among 
Mexican workers in the mid-1930s fostered a labor militancy on the west side that led to 
a series of strikes in several industries.  Moreover, solidarity formed through a variety of 
organizations and social activities served the shellers well during their work stoppage by 
giving them vital support from fellow Tejanos. 
While discrimination and limited job possibilities provided pecan workers a 
reason for discontent and solidarity allowed them to pose a legitimate threat to their 
employers, neither of those factors account for the strike’s timing.  Rather, the general 
mood of the community in 1938 signaled that even Anglo residents of San Antonio 
would be sympathetic to a walkout.  Evidence of the pro-labor atmosphere can be culled 
from election results at the federal, state, and local levels in the 1930s that indicated 
Anglo willingness to support labor against management.  Without such indications that 
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the city’s white population would at least remain neutral during a strike, the shellers 
would probably not have believed they could successfully challenge the city’s pecan 
operators. 
* * * * * 
A cursory examination of the pecan industry in Texas prior to the Great 
Depression adds context to the events of the shellers’ strike.  By the 1930s, those who 
occupied the strip of central Texas between the Brazos and Nueces Rivers had enjoyed 
pecans for hundreds of years.  The state’s sandy river bottoms proved an ideal 
environment for wild groves.  As early as 1533 Spanish explorers, including Lope de 
Oviedo and Álvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca, noted that the indigenous population 
consumed the nuts in significant quantities.  Moreover, pioneering pecan cultivator E. E. 
Risien claimed to own a fossilized kernel that a neighbor discovered 38 feet underground 
while digging a water well.  No real planning went into pecan horticulture in Texas until 
1880, when F. A. Swinden planted the state’s first commercial orchard on 400 acres near 
Brownwood.  Most growers during that era maintained trees exclusively along streams, 
often in single file, unless widespread lowlands allowed for more dispersed groves.  
Settlers new to central Texas sold bags of pecans in San Antonio for a nickel per pound 
just as commercial orchards came into being, and by 1882 G. A. Duerler, Sr., was hiring 
Mexicans to crack the nuts with railroad spikes and shipping the edible meats to the east 
coast.5 
                                                 
5 Fred R. Brison, Pecan Culture (Austin:  Capital Printing, 1974), 2-3, 6-7; E. E. Risien, Pecan Culture for 
Western Texas (San Saba, TX: Published by Author, 1904),  8; S. A. Jones et al., An Economic Study of 
the Pecan Industry, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Technical Bulletin 324 (Washington, D. C.:  
Government Printing Office, September 1932), 11; Seldon C. Menefee and Orin C. Cassemore, The Pecan 
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By the early 1900s, the tree had achieved symbolic status in Texas.  E. J. Kyle, 
dean of the Texas A&M School of Agriculture, first offered a course in pecan cultivation 
in 1911, and he continued to do so each year until his retirement in 1948.  The state 
Department of Agriculture established the Pecan Division in 1915, and the state 
legislature proclaimed the pecan the state tree four years later, declaring that “patriotic 
Texans who have pioneered in the propagation and improvement of the pecan thus far, 
have rendered their State an outstanding constructive service which is a real heritage to 
present and future generations.”  Former governor James S. Hogg expressed his 
sentiment for the tree by insisting that he wanted “no monument of stone or marble, but 
plant at my head a pecan tree and at my feet an old-fashioned walnut . . . and when these 
trees shall bear, let the pecans and walnuts be given out among the plain people of 
Texas, so that they may plant them and make Texas a land of trees.”6 
Into the 1920s, the public beyond Texas and the South began clamoring for 
pecans.  Improved varieties, such as the Stuart, the Success, and the Moneymaker, 
typically shipped directly to consumers who then shelled them in their homes.  These 
varieties came primarily from states east of the Mississippi River, particularly Georgia.  
Ninety percent of the nuts grown in Texas, however, were seedlings.  Seedling varieties 
lacked the size and sweetness of their improved brethren, but could be purchased for less 
than half the price.  In 1928, for example, improved varieties sold for 52 cents per 
                                                                                                                                                
Shellers of San Antonio:  The Problem of Underpaid and Unemployed Mexican Labor, Federal Works 
Agency, Work Projects Administration, Division of Research (Washington, D. C.:  Government Printing 
Office, 1940), 7. 
6 Brison, Pecan Culture, 12; J. H. Burkett, The Pecan in Texas:  Pecan Soils, Districts, Streams, Orchards, 
Groves, Care, Propagation, Cultivation, Covercrops, Irrigation, Production, Insects, Diseases, Etc., 
Texas Department of Agriculture, Bulletin 111 (Austin:  Texas Department of Agriculture, July-August 
1932), foreword and introduction (first and second quotes). 
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pound, while seedling varieties cost only 24 cents per pound.  Transportation costs from 
Georgia to the nearest shelleries in Chicago or St. Louis could add another dollar to the 
cost of each pound of improved pecans.  Seedling pecans particularly appealed to 
confectioners, bakers, and ice cream vendors who used them as ingredients rather than 
stand-alone treats.  To further reduce expenses, operators shelled seedling pecans in San 
Antonio, then shipped only the meats to customers across the nation.  This step allowed 
shelleries to reduce shipping weights, and therefore costs, by almost two-thirds.   
Although most consumers preferred unshelled nuts for sanitary reasons, they willingly 
indulged in less expensive foods enhanced with seedling pecans from Texas.7 
Texas pecan growers found themselves well-positioned as nationwide demand 
for pecans increased.  Large tracts of suitable land and inexpensive agricultural labor 
catapulted the state into the national lead in production.  In 1925 Texas groves housed 
nearly 2.5 million pecan trees.  By 1929 that figure had ballooned to 6.6 million trees, 
which produced more than 9.5 million pounds of pecans.  At decade’s end, thirteen 
counties in central Texas surpassed 200,000 pounds of production a year and accounted 
for more than half of the state’s harvest.  San Saba County led the way in 1929 with 
745,324 pounds harvested.  Beyond good soil and cheap labor, growers expanded 
quickly because pecan growing became big business in Texas before it did in other 
states.  The early 1930s saw 44 percent of Texas’s growers claiming more than 2,000 
trees in their groves, and the average number of trees per enterprise topped 175.  Second 
place Oklahoma’s growers, in comparison, averaged 110 trees each.  Georgia, the only 
                                                 
7 Menefee and Cassmore, Pecan Shellers, 6-7; Jones et al., Pecan Industry, 63-4, 79-81, 85. 
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state outside of Texas to produce more than three million pounds of pecans in 1929, 
averaged only 68 trees per grove.  Texas eclipsed all other states in production 
throughout the 1930s, accounting for one-third to one-half of the national total each 
year.8 
As the state’s growers sought methods of outpacing their rivals, so too did Texas 
pecan shelling operators.  Like other light manufacturers, most operators turned to 
mechanization.  The process began in 1889 when Robert E. Woodson developed the first 
lever-operated cracking machine.  He improved upon that effort in 1914 by providing 
operators with the first power-driven crackers.  Rudimentary machines that sorted nuts 
based on size soon followed, but the fragile nature of the meats made mechanized 
shelling impractical.  Unbroken halves constituted the most valuable meats, which made 
hand shelling the only viable option for operators through the 1930s.  G. A. Duerler 
reached the pinnacle of mechanization in 1928, when cracking and grading operations 
were completely automated and 1,000 Mexican women and girls shelled the pecans then 
packaged them for shipping.  Duerler dominated the shelling industry by 1930.  His 
operation soon faced a formidable challenge, however, when an upstart competitor 
introduced a more flexible business model that defied conventional thinking about 
mechanization.9 
In 1926, Julius Seligmann used the land he inherited from his father and $50,000 
in cash to found the Southern Pecan Shelling Company.  At a time when the industry’s 
                                                 
8 Menefee and Cassemore, Pecan Shellers, xv; Jones et al., Pecan Industry, 7-9, 11-2; Burkett, Pecan in 
Texas, 228-32. 
9 Menefee and Cassemore, Pecan Shellers, x, xv, 7-8. 
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largest operators, including Duerler and R. E. Funsten in St. Louis, marched toward 
increased mechanization, Seligmann envisioned plants filled with inexpensive manual 
laborers rather than machinery.  These sweatshop shelleries drastically reduced the 
startup capital required to enter the pecan business.  Whether or not Seligmann’s 
business plan could compete with those of larger, mechanized operators initially 
remained unclear.  Perhaps if the economy had continued to boom as it had through 
much of the 1920s, Southern Pecan’s seemingly retrogressive model would have failed.  
Instead, it was the economy that failed.   
As the Great Depression devastated business and industry, mechanized pecan 
operators found it difficult to cut spending.  Expensive machinery required maintenance 
and upgrades, and operating costs did not decline as far or as quickly as pecan prices.  In 
contrast, Southern Pecan thrived during the Depression.  With few capital expenses, 
Seligmann simply cut wages to ensure his pecans sold at a profit.  No longer able to 
continue, Duerler’s operation collapsed under the Depression’s immense weight.  
Southern Pecan survived by transferring that weight off of the business onto its 
employees.10 
By the early 1930s, Seligmann had established a monopoly over the pecan 
industry that allowed him to set wages for all operators in San Antonio.  
Demechanization created thousands of low-paying jobs for the city’s Mexican 
population.  The number of positions peaked over the winter of 1933-4, when San 
Antonio’s operators employed as many as twenty thousand shellers in more than four 
                                                 
10 Ibid., x, 8, 12. 
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hundred facilities spread across Bexar County.  Southern Pecan commissioned more of 
those workers than any other operator.  By 1935 the company enjoyed the largest market 
share in the nation, turning out approximately one-third of all the pecans shelled in the 
United States.  The following year, as many businesses struggled for survival, Southern 
Pecan grossed more than three million dollars in profit.  The combination of inexpensive 
Mexican labor and an expansive growing area constituted Southern Pecan’s simple, yet 
effective, blueprint for success, but chronically low wages engendered considerable 
resentment on the west side.11 
* * * * * 
Like farmers throughout the nation and other manufacturing concerns in San 
Antonio, Southern Pecan relied on a pool of readily available laborers willing to take 
temporary or seasonal work.  In Texas, those workers overwhelmingly tended to be 
Mexican.  In recent years, several scholars have examined the role of Mexican labor in 
the United States generally and in Texas specifically.  Mark Reisler’s study of Latino 
workers north of the Rio Grande concludes that “the [Franklin D.] Roosevelt 
administration showed little inclination to protect the political or economic security of 
Mexican workers.”  Additionally, Reisler claims that “Mexican unions were more ad hoc 
than permanent.  They were . . .  victims of flaws characteristic of all migrant 
organizations:  financial and political impotence engendered by rootlessness.”  While 
these claims may generally be true, the pecan workers’ story demonstrates that President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt did take notice of the shellers and their families on the west side.  
                                                 
11 Ibid., xv, 7-9; Texas Civil Liberties Union, San Antonio, 3. 
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Moreover, Tejanos in San Antonio proved they could build organizations that, while 
limited in some respects, were certainly not impotent.12   
More recently, several major works have explored Mexican workers in Texas.  
David Montejano’s 1987 monograph remains required reading for anyone seeking to 
understand racial relations between Anglos and Mexicans in Texas history.  Since then, 
Emilio Zamora has focused this lens of racial relations on the dealings between Tejano 
workers and their mostly white employers, arguing that those workers formed 
organizations designed to protect and promote their interests as early as the turn of the 
twentieth century.  Zaragosa Vargas builds on Zamora’s work, contending that the labor 
organizations Mexicans formed in the 1930s and 1940s included elements of a nascent 
civil-rights crusade that reached maturity in the 1960s as the Chicano Movement.  While 
these works demonstrate Mexican aptitude in forming groups that proved crucial in 
creating solidarity, they do little to explain the timing of the shellers’ strike, let alone the 
wave of strikes that preceded it.13 
 Although the pecan shellers still await the monograph that tells their complete 
story, several articles in the past six decades chronicle their 1938 strike.  Harold Shapiro 
examined early organizations that attempted to unionize the pecan workers in the mid-
1930s, such as El Nogal, and concentrated on the role of CIO leadership during the 
strike.  He also considered how the minimum wage requirements stipulated in the 
                                                 
12 Mark Reisler, By the Sweat of Their Brow:  Mexican Immigrant Labor in the United States, 1900-1940 
(Westport, CT:  Greenwood Press, 1976), 248-9. 
13 David Montejano, Anglos and Mexicans in the Making of Texas, 1836-1986 (Austin:  University of 
Texas Press, 1987); Emilio Zamora, The World of the Mexican Worker in Texas (College Station:  Texas 
A&M University Press, 1993); Zaragosa Vargas, Labor Rights Are Civil Rights:  Mexican American 
Workers in Twentieth-Century America (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 2005).  
  
 12
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and mechanization affected the pecan workers 
and their union.  Kenneth Walker further emphasized mechanization’s impact on the 
pecan industry.  Like Shapiro, Walker claimed that mechanization fundamentally 
changed the pecan industry and subsequently resulted in many hardships for workers 
displaced by equipment.  More recently, Patricia Gower has explored the strike’s 
substantial political fallout, demonstrating that San Antonio’s Mexican community 
abandoned the city’s political machine by the spring of 1939.  Voting in their own 
interests, Tejanos overturned the city’s establishment by electing former U.S. 
Congressman Maury Maverick mayor.  Although Maverick’s time in city hall proved 
short, San Antonio’s Mexican community exercised their political might and provided 
warning to future candidates who might take their votes for granted.  Other historians 
briefly discuss the strike in broader works, but these accounts typically echo the 
episode’s milestones and focus on the mechanization and federal legislation that affected 
pecan workers after the strike without offering new interpretations.14 
The majority of scholars who have considered the shellers’ strike have 
characterized it as a spontaneous reaction to the one-cent pay cut that took effect in the 
                                                 
14 Harold A. Shapiro, “The Pecan Sheller of San Antonio, Texas,” Southwestern Social Science Quarterly 
32 (March 1952):  229-44; Kenneth P. Walker, “The Pecan Shellers of San Antonio and Mechanization,” 
Southwestern Historical Quarterly 69 (July 1965):  44-58; Patricia E. Gower, “Unintended Consequences:  
The San Antonio Pecan Shellers’ Strike of 1938,” Journal of South Texas 17 (Fall 2004):  88-103; Irene 
Ledesma, “Texas Newspapers and Chicana Workers’ Activism, 1919-1974,” Western Historical Quarterly 
26 (Autumn 1995):  309-31; J. Gilberto Quesada, “Toward a Working Definition of Social Justice:  Father 
Carmelo A. Tranchese, S. J., and Our Lady of Guadalupe Parish, 1932-1953,” Journal of Texas Catholic 
History and Culture 4 (1993):  44-64; Zaragosa Vargas, “Tejana Radical:  Emma Tenayuca and the San 
Antonio Labor Movement during the Great Depression,” Pacific Historical Review 66 (November 1997):  
553-80. 
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winter of 1937-8.15  The shellers’ actions were far from spontaneous, however, and the 
pay reduction simply sparked an explosive atmosphere that had developed over years.  
The pecan workers’ reasons for fighting the pay decrease were ample, and most 
stemmed from discrimination in education, the labor market, and in housing.  The 
poverty that followed from discrimination did not prevent Mexicans from forming and 
participating in a multitude of organizations that bred solidarity amongst members of the 
community and allowed them to develop crucial skills.  Furthermore, by the late 1930s 
the Great Depression had transformed American thinking about the proper relationships 
between labor, capital, and the government.  That transformation presented workers with 
an opportunity for action.  Poverty and solidarity intersected with opportunity in San 
Antonio on January 31, 1938, when thousands of pecan workers resisted their 
employers’ attempts to reduce wages by launching the largest strike in the city’s history.  
Their success can only be explained by examining each of these three elements that led 
to the strike in more detail. 
 
15 The following attribute the strike primarily to the pay cut: Roger C. Barnes and Jim Donovan, “The 
Southern Pecan Shelling Company:  A Window to Depression-Era San Antonio,” South Texas Studies 11 
(2000):  58; Ledesma, “Texas Newspapers,” 317; Menefee and Cassemore, Pecan Shellers, 17; Walker, 
“Pecan Shellers,” 49.  These authors characterized the strike as spontaneous:  Richard Croxdale, “The 
1938 Pecan Sheller’s Strike,” in Women in the Texas Workforce:  Yesterday and Today, ed. Richard 
Croxdale and Melissa Hield (Austin:  People’s History in Texas, 1979), 28;  Gabriela Gonzalez, “Carolina 
Munguia and Emma Tenayuca:  The Politics of Benevolence and Radical Reform,” Frontiers 24 (2003):  
214; Stuart Marshall Jamison, Labor Unionism in American Agriculture, U.S. Department of Labor, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 836 (Washington, D. C.:  Government Printing Office, 1945), 280; 
Reisler, Sweat of Their Brow, 229-30; Shapiro, “Pecan Sheller,” 235. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
IMMIGRATION, DISCRIMINATION, AND WORK 
 
San Antonio’s pecan industry almost exclusively employed Mexican labor after 
the founding of Southern Pecan in 1926.  The reasons were simple:  profits from hand 
shelling depended largely on the cost of labor, and an abundance of Tejano agricultural 
workers in the city during the winter months suppressed wages.  The surplus of such 
labor began building earlier in the century, when immigration to south Texas from 
Mexico accelerated due to political and economic factors on both sides of the Rio 
Grande.  Migrant workers from Mexico encountered migrant farmers from the Midwest 
and South, reshaping social relations between Anglos and Mexicans in the region.  
Increased ethnic stratification led to occupational stratification, and Tejanos found 
themselves barred from most skilled positions and other well-paying jobs.  Rural 
Mexicans picked a variety of crops in Texas and other parts of the nation, while urban 
Mexicans worked in light manufacturing, construction, or service jobs.  Both earned low 
wages and endured poor working conditions.  This was particularly true for pecan 
shellers, as their ranks swelled with Tejanos physically unable to perform other sorts of 
work.  By 1938, largely as the result of a discriminatory labor market, shellers were the 
lowest paid workers in the nation, and they toiled in dark, dusty shacks that lacked heat, 
ventilation, and often restrooms.  Such dismal conditions provided shellers ample reason 
to strike. 
 
 
  
 15
* * * * * 
Immigration from Mexico dramatically increased after 1900 as thousand poured 
into Texas to either work on the railroad or in agricultural jobs.  In the previous thirty 
years the Mexican population in the U.S. had more than doubled from less than 45,000 
to nearly 100,000.  This increase seems significant on the surface, but Anglo migration 
from the Midwest and the South to southern Texas actually outpaced that of Mexicans 
over the same period.  Migration quickened in the opening decade of the twentieth 
century, as nearly 25,000 Mexican nationals crossed the Rio Grande into the U.S.  
Railroads and mining interests in Mexico’s less populated northern states lured 
unemployed workers from the central and southern parts of the nation, and by 1900 the 
rail network allowed relatively easy passage to the American border.  During the same 
period, improved irrigation and refrigerated rail cars made wide-scale commercial 
agriculture viable in South Texas.  These improvements spurred railroad development in 
the Rio Grande Valley, and Mexican nationals often entered the United States to 
continue working in that industry.  This wave of immigrants between 1900 and 1910 
included few of the elites who characterized later migrations, and instead came “largely 
from the migratory laboring class of their own country,” according to one federal report.  
Upon arriving in Texas, the typical worker had traveled “a thousand miles from his 
home” where “American employers, with a gold wage, . . . had little difficulty in 
attracting him across that not very formidable dividing line.”  Many immigrants paid 
between $10 and $12 for bus tickets to a port of entry into the U.S., the most popular 
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being El Paso.  Some journeyed from their homes in central and southern Mexico as far 
north as the upper Midwest each year.  Most, however, remained closer to home.16 
Whereas economic factors spawned a trickle of immigration into Texas before 
1910, Mexico’s bloody revolution fuelled a flood of immigration after that date.  
Between 1910 and 1919, more than 170,000 Mexicans entered the U.S., and that number 
grew to 487,000 the following decade.  Furthermore, Mexican records suggest that U.S. 
figures substantially underreported the rate of immigration.  In 1911, for example, 
American sources indicate that 18,784 migrants entered the U.S. from Mexico.  That 
same year the Mexican government counted more than 58,000 emigrants to the U.S.17 
American officials registered such inaccurate counts for several reasons.  Many 
Latinos wanted to avoid “embarrassing questions as to literacy, worldly wealth, and 
other things,” and some found the eight-dollar head tax required for legal entry 
unaffordable.  “Why bother the officials and undergo the necessity of answering strange 
questions from the brusk gringoes [sic],” one journalist asked, “when upon paying a 
ferryman a dollar one could cross the Rio Grande almost anywhere, and thereafter go in 
peace to practically any place within the perfectly safe domain of Uncle Sam?”  
Laborers who lived in Mexico and worked in the U.S., thus crossing the border twice 
each day, further complicated the task of census workers and immigration officials.  
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Despite this degree of unreliability, the raw data clearly demonstrates that immigration 
accelerated during World War I and throughout the 1920s.  Once the wave of migration 
that began in 1910 ceased in 1930, Mexico had lost ten percent of its population to death 
or emigration. In contrast, the Mexican population of Texas had tripled.18 
The sudden surge in Mexican immigration received mixed reactions from the 
American public.  Businesses, particularly large South Texas farming interests, generally 
favored open borders, and the state’s agribusiness lobby persuaded the U.S. Congress to 
exclude Mexican nationals from anti-immigration legislation in the 1920s.  By that time 
a patchwork of disparate groups, including small farmers, eugenics proponents, and 
organized labor, coalesced in opposition to unfettered Mexican immigration.  Those 
exclusionists rationalized ending Mexican immigration for both economic and social 
reasons.  Small farmers worried about competing against better financed rivals who 
could afford to employ legions of inexpensive Mexican laborers, and the American 
Federation of Labor (AFL) feared that immigration suppressed white wages.  Eugenics 
advocates believed that Mexican nationals lacked inherent qualities essential to 
participation in a representative democracy.  Despite these arguments, exclusionists 
enjoyed little success during the 1920s.  Most of the nation considered Mexican 
immigration a regional, rather than national, problem until later decades.19 
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With opposition to immigration weak, Mexicans filled both the rural and urban 
areas of Texas.  San Antonio proved a popular Latino destination for several reasons.  
Historically, the city had maintained a substantial Mexican presence.  Geographically, its 
proximity to the border allowed people and culture to flow in and out with relative ease.  
Economically, the arrival of railroads and commercial agriculture connected San 
Antonio to the rest of the nation by World War I.  This meant jobs for semiskilled and 
unskilled labor, as did construction work provided by new and expanding military 
installations and a burgeoning light manufacturing sector.  San Antonio also served as a 
clearing house for low-wage labor.  Even prior to the revolution, one government official 
recognized that the city was “probably the most important distributing point of Mexican 
labor for Texas proper.”  That role continued into the 1930s, and, as one municipal 
report concluded, many migrant workers used the city “as a farm labor camp during the 
winter months since it [was] the largest recruiting center for Latin-American farm labor 
in the country.”  Beyond its economic significance, the city functioned as a meeting 
place for elite exiles, as upper-class Mexican nationals streamed into San Antonio during 
the first years of the Mexican Revolution.  More than 25,000 resided in the city by 1913, 
although many considered their stays temporary.  Most elites expected to return to 
Mexico once the political situation there stabilized.20 
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The revolution dragged on, however, and San Antonio steadily accumulated 
Mexican residents.  By 1930 more than 82,000 Latinos lived in the city, up from about 
29,000 in 1910.  When the pecan shellers struck in 1938, estimates showed 100,000 
Mexicans in San Antonio, nearly 40 percent of the city’s total population.  Despite a 
relentless repatriation campaign that slowed immigration to Texas in the 1930s, the 
city’s Mexican population continued to grow.  By 1950 only four cities in Mexico 
claimed more citizens of Mexican descent than San Antonio.21 
Not all migration into San Antonio and south Texas during the first half of the 
twentieth century came from below the Rio Grande, however.  White settlers left the 
American South and Midwest for south Texas hoping to find the cheap, plentiful 
farmland advertised by promoters.  Speculators preceded those farmers and sold them 
land purchased for as little as fifty cents an acre in the 1890s for as much as $300 an acre 
ten years later.  In addition to cash, the newcomers brought racial attitudes with them 
that informed their dealings with Tejanos.  Southerners who equated Mexicans with 
African Americans fought to implement Jim Crow in their new surroundings.  Rural 
Midwesterners had less personal experience interacting with racial minorities, but 
considered chronically high disease rates in the Mexican community evidence of poor 
hygiene and general uncleanliness.22 
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The recent arrivals’ generally low opinions of Tejanos often extended to the 
native Anglo population of south Texas, as well.  Many newcomers looked 
disparagingly on the extant society, and set upon “civilizing” the area.  Conflict arose 
amongst Anglos on several fronts, but, according to historian David Montejano, it 
“centered on control of county governments that possessed the power of tax assessment 
and collection and the provision of public services.”  New settlers sought high 
governmental investment in infrastructure, while their long-time Texan counterparts 
preferred lower taxes.  To enact desired changes, newcomers divorced established 
politicians from their largely Mexican constituency with poll taxes that discouraged 
Tejano voting and measures forbidding interpreters in voting places.  By the late 1910s 
hostilities between long-time residents of the region and their newer Anglo counterparts 
ceased, as both groups realized that their common interests outweighed their 
disagreements.23 
The native white population in South Texas, after all, harbored their own racially 
charged attitudes toward Mexicans.  Military victories in the Texas Revolution and 
Mexican-American War, as well as countless skirmishes between Latinos and Texas 
Rangers, led many Anglos to view Mexicans as both violent and inferior.  Nevertheless, 
as immigration increased, so did the percentage of Mexican nationals in South Texas.  
Anglos came to assume that all Tejanos were Mexican nationals, a trend accelerated by 
white migrants who failed to understand the historical complexities of ethnicity and 
citizenship in the region.  Assumptions of citizenship often justified withholding civil 
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rights from Tejanos, many of whom further aroused suspicions by defiantly identifying 
as Mexican nationals.  Some Anglos, however, recognized the emotional dilemma 
citizenship posed to Mexicans.  “The Mexican knows he is entering territory that used to 
belong to Mexico,” wrote one uncommonly sympathetic observer, “and which he dreams 
may some day be returned.  And so while the immigrant from across the Atlantic arrives 
with the dream of becoming an American citizen, it is doubtful if among the two or three 
million Mexicans who have crossed the Rio Grand, a dozen ever came with any such 
intention.”  This informant further postulated that Americans erred in believing that 
“Americanization is a dose to be administered entirely to the alien.  We look at him en 
masse, and wonder what ought to be done to him, little realizing that for intelligent 
solution of the problem, we might well be wondering also what we ought to do to 
ourselves.”24 
Beyond citizenship, white Texans struggled to place the round pegs of Mexican 
ethnicity into the square holes of segregation.  Brown skin disqualified Tejanos from 
being white, but did not necessarily condemn them to the same fate as African 
Americans.  Jim Crow applied only sporadically to Mexicans in most parts of south 
Texas, but de facto segregation typically followed from economic conditions.  Low-rent 
housing and inexpensive restaurants, movie theater seats, and rail tickets kept Tejanos 
both concentrated together and away from Anglos, particularly in San Antonio.   
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Mexicans often attended African American schools where such institutions existed, but a 
dearth of blacks in south Texas occasionally meant the establishment of Mexican 
schools.  A minority of those who supported Jim Crow criticized three-tiered segregation 
because they saw social and political promise in the Tejano community.  “The Mexican 
is theoretically not limited either in his educational opportunities or in his occupational 
field,” one representative of this camp claimed, “Neither is he disfranchised.  He is 
educating himself rapidly, only to find that his education above the literacy line is quite 
useless to him.  He will soon be going to college in large numbers, and he will soon 
wield an emphatic and brilliant English pen.  He will organize his group politically and 
then what?”25 
Nevertheless, most Anglos were blind to this potential, and their arguments for 
perceived Tejano mediocrity ranged widely.  Prominent contemporary economist Paul S. 
Taylor noted that “belief in the inferiority of Mexicans was general, and was assumed by 
many to be axiomatic, although whether the inferiority was biological or social, whether 
it could be removed with education or not, occasioned more differences of opinion.”  
Those subscribing to biological explanations typically rested their arguments on the 
foundation of Social Darwinism.  This group viewed the plight of Tejano workers as 
evidence of a biological defect in the Mexican “race,” and believed that most had 
already “reached their potential as actors in the political and economic spheres.”  
Moreover, many Anglos drew lines of distinction within the Mexican community 
according to complexion.  Light-skinned Latinos suffered less discrimination than their 
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darker-skinned companions, many of whom ranked only slightly above African 
Americans socially.  Outdoor work further punished Mexican laborers in this regard, as 
the sun darkened their skin while they toiled in the fields and on the railroads.26 
Others favored environment over biology in explaining the plight of Tejanos.  
One informant believed that “unfavorable climatic conditions in certain sections of 
Mexico, inadequate food, and a dull social life have combined to make ‘a lazy 
Mexican.’”  Another theory identified disparate levels of industrialization between the 
U.S. and Mexico as the culprit.  Proponents claimed that recent immigrants needed time 
to acclimate to the quick pace and long hours that American employers expected.  Some 
critics of biological causation attacked the scientific underpinnings of Social Darwinism 
directly.  They viewed the theory as a product of racism rather than of scientific 
understanding.  Noted Mexican sociologist Manuel Gamio recognized as much, 
declaring there was “no scientific basis for an innate inferiority of the Mexican, nothing 
beyond the dark pigmentation of the Mexican to account for the racial prejudice against 
him.”27 
Of the stereotypes leveled against Tejano workers, laziness was perhaps the most 
damaging.  Workers could be “dirty,” since they spent most of their time with each 
other, and even the most “ignorant” workers could be shown how to perform rote tasks 
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with some efficiency.  No employer could abide “lazy” workers, however, because they 
viewed sluggishness as a choice.  Management often used slothfulness to justify 
subjecting workers to dangerous or unsanitary conditions.  A contemporary journalist 
suggested cultural misunderstanding as the root of friction between Mexican labor and 
Anglo management, explaining that the American’s “love of speed convinces him that 
the Mexican has no idea of the value of time, while the Mexican feels sure that the 
American is simply rude.” He went on to conclude that “as a consequence, the American 
has much to say about the ‘mañana’ propensities of his Mexican neighbor, while the 
alien from the south feels sure he is dealing with a manicured savage, whom for some 
inexplicable reason, the gods of fortune have peculiarly blessed.”  Most employers 
attempted to overcome this perceived shortcoming in the Tejano workforce by 
implementing incentive wages.  Agricultural workers typically earned a set amount per 
pound of crop harvested, while industrial workers were often paid by the piece.28 
At the same time, Mexican also workers had defenders.  Arthur J. Drossaerts, 
Bishop and then Archbishop of San Antonio between 1918 and 1940, stated the 
predicament of Tejanos in stark terms, claiming that “Negro slaves before emancipation 
were a thousand times better off than these poor, defenseless people.”  Some Anglos 
vouched for the basically good nature of Mexicans and their desire to become good 
Americans, while others fought to demonstrate intellectual and moral equality between 
whites and Latinos.  Several commentators described Mexicans as peaceful, clever,  
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loyal, and “at heart honest.”  A common concern of whites involved the lack of interest 
upper-class Mexicans displayed for their downtrodden compatriots.  One Anglo 
lamented the situation, arguing that the relatively well-off political exiles were “the 
group from which leaders could be recruited for the masses. . . . But from home they 
have never been required to take any interest in the masses except as exploiters.  The 
Mexican masses mean nothing to them in Mexico and they mean nothing to them in 
Texas.”  Unfortunately for Tejanos, most white appeals for justice were ignored.29 
Discrimination and racial prejudice manifested in several ways.  For Mexican 
workers, one was the emergence of a dual labor market.  Anglos labored in the market’s 
primary sector in jobs characterized by high wages, fringe benefits, and job security.  
Tejanos, conversely, toiled in the secondary sector, where low pay, lack of benefits, and 
high turnover rates accompanied most positions.  The dual labor market’s most insidious 
feature, however, was a nearly impenetrable barrier between the two sectors that 
relegated Mexicans to the lowest economic stratum in Texas.  Without hope of 
advancement, Tejanos took virtually any work offered. 
Texas became the beneficiary of plentiful, inexpensive Mexican labor just as 
other southern states experienced a significant loss of equally affordable African 
American labor.  Immediately after World War I, thousands of blacks left the rural South 
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in search of better jobs, and better treatment, in the northern cities.  This migration 
affected other southern states more than Texas, where Tejanos quickly replaced lost 
labor, and by 1919 Texas led the nation in total value of agricultural production.  
Although one Department of Commerce and Labor official characterized Tejanos as 
“unambitious, listless, physically weak, irregular, and indolent,” he nonetheless accepted 
the conventional wisdom that they were well-suited to farm work in the hot, arid 
environment of south Texas.  A contemporary observer attributed this aptitude to their 
Aztec roots, claiming that Mexicans “had a rather high type of civilization, and were 
village dwellers,” who, even centuries earlier, made “good farm-workers.”  Others saw a 
considerable downside to immigrant labor.  Many worried over the social costs of 
having so many Tejanos in Texas, and one detractor asserted that “the evils to the 
community at large which their presence in large numbers almost invariably brings may 
more than overbalance their desirable qualities.  Their low standard of living and of 
morals, their illiteracy, their utter lack of proper political interest, the retarding effect of 
their employment upon the wage scale of the more progressive races, and finally their 
tendency to colonize in urban centers, . . . combine to stamp them as a rather undesirable 
class of residents.”  Yet, in their drive to increase profits, Texas growers dismissed these 
worries and continued hiring Tejanos.  By 1937, the Texas Farm Placement Service 
estimated that Mexicans constituted 85 percent of all migratory farm laborers in the 
state.30 
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Although agriculture remained the primary source of employment for Mexicans 
in Texas throughout the 1920s and 1930s, many found work in other occupations.  
Railroads employed more Tejanos than any other non-agricultural enterprises, and 
occasionally used more Latino labor than farmers during winter months.  One Texas 
railroad official explained that Mexicans were “better than any other immigrant labor we 
can get.  They are better than Negroes [sic] at ballasting, laying ties, and ordinary track 
work,” though he also lamented that he had “to carry about 50 men on a pay roll to be 
sure of 30 to 35 men working every day.”  Railroads also appealed to Tejanos because 
they transported laborers from their homes to their places of work for free, eliminating 
the need to find a ride through notoriously unscrupulous labor agents, otherwise known 
as enganchadores.  Moreover, if workers stayed with the railroad for at least six months, 
they typically received free transportation back to their homes as well, a significant 
bonus for workers who usually earned less than $1.25 each day.  Many Mexicans 
forewent that bonus, however, and left to work in the fields.  Railroads suffered a steady 
attrition of labor as farmers lured workers with promises of better wages, a tactic that 
saved growers the expenses associated with recruiting labor.  According to one estimate 
in 1907, thirty percent of the wheat harvesters in Kansas were Mexicans who had 
deserted the railroad, and entire work gangs sometimes abandoned the rails to pick 
cotton in Texas.  Beyond railroad work, some Tejanos in rural areas hired out as 
blacksmiths, carpenters, and masons, although most could only find such work near the 
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border.  Others found employment in small towns and villages as ice haulers, auto 
mechanics, and truck drivers.31 
The bulk of Mexicans toiled in the fields, however, and farmers and growers 
searched endlessly for means of limiting their movement.  Many employers realized that 
women and children significantly reduced Tejano men’s mobility.  Those employers 
encouraged entire families to work on their farms, knowing men would be reluctant to 
leave their loved ones behind for better opportunities.  Furthermore, farmers struck deals 
with labor agents that made the laborer, rather than the employer, responsible for paying 
transportation costs, meaning that Mexican field hands could find themselves in debt 
even before beginning work.  Anglos designed this measure in response to the notion 
that after earning a few dollars, Tejanos would “quit, because they would have enough 
money for beans and tortillas for a week.”  Coercive methods eventually became more 
sophisticated.  Under the labor contract system, migrant workers bid against one another 
for the right to harvest a particular crop, with the low bidder receiving the contract.  
Besides suppressing wages to an absolute minimum, contracts invariably withheld 25 
percent of the total price as retainage until the crop was completely harvested.  Most 
migratory workers forfeited this portion of their pay, as they could ill afford to postpone 
moving on to their next job.  Similarly, the family contract system paid Tejanos enough 
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that a couple and several children working together could survive, but one or two adults 
working alone could not support their offspring.32 
In addition to exploitative contracts, growers threatened workers with 
deportation.  The Farm Placement Division of the Texas State Employment Service 
reported that illegal entries into the U.S. outnumbered legal entries into the 1920s.  
Employers and labor agents “could and often did keep the fact of illegality . . . dangling 
over the heads of the frightened peon workers, paying them meager wages and treating 
them almost as slaves.”  Mexican workers occasionally had allies, however.  Those who 
physically assaulted their laborers, for example, risked garnering attention from the 
Mexican consulate.  Consuls regularly pushed for higher wages and better working 
conditions on American farms, and even supplied workers with a sample contract 
designed to protect their wages.  Yet, the contracts proved impotent because American 
employers refused to sign them, the U.S. and Texas governments refused to enforce 
them, and migrant workers refused to trust a Mexican government that had historically 
undermined their interests.  In other instances the consulate proved more helpful.  In 
1918, Consul General Teodulo Beltran stepped in on behalf of beet field workers in 
California, and in another case consuls ensured highway construction workers would be 
paid by placing a lien on the project.33 
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At the same time, migrant workers developed techniques for confronting 
employers when consuls could not, or would not, help.  Mobility and the willingness to 
travel formed their most potent weapons, and growers by the 1920s understood that they 
competed against one another for labor in a national market.  A spinach farmer in South 
Texas who refused to pay a minimum threshold of wages could see his entire labor force 
leave to work onion fields in the next county or sugar beet fields as far away as 
Michigan.  One family that crossed the border at Laredo in 1920, for example, cleared 
land near San Antonio, worked in a cotton seed oil factory in Belton, Texas, packed 
meat in Fort Worth, and eventually picked sugar beets near Casper, Wyoming, in 1927.  
From there they purchased a car, picked beets again in Colorado, and then worked in the 
coal mines of New Mexico before returning to Texas late in 1928.  Buying automobiles 
reduced travel costs significantly, and often removed usurious enganchadores from the 
equation.  Many Tejanos acquired cars at their first opportunity despite having to pay 
inflated prices for used models.  After working several seasons, Tejanos used their own 
autos and knowledge of the industry to anticipate labor needs and travel to areas that 
promised the best wages.  By the 1930s, so many Mexicans owned cars that they often 
raced to a particular location only to find hundreds of other unemployed migrant workers 
with the same idea begging for jobs.  Generally, however, independent mobility afforded 
Tejanos some leverage in dealing with their employers.34 
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Whether migratory workers owned their own means of transportation or not, at 
some point most spent time in Texas’s cotton fields.  Harvest began each year near 
Brownsville in late June.  To one observer, it seemed that by “July and August . . . most 
of the Mexicans of the state converge on Corpus Christi.”  Workers traveled in “caravans 
led by contristas who know enough English and have sufficient initiative and experience 
to take the lead in finding employment and making labor contracts for others.”  Pickers 
worked their way north until the last bale was weighed, at which point they returned to 
their homes or went to cities such as San Antonio in search of winter employment.  By 
1919 the state produced 2.7 million bales of the crop annually, 20 percent of the national 
total and more than any other state.  Mexican men, women, and children picked most of 
that cotton as families; indeed, one in six workers had not yet reached their fourteenth 
birthday.  Growers required one family per 40 acres of cultivation on average, meaning 
that each square mile of cotton fields housed approximately sixteen Mexican families.  
Most lived in one room shacks that rarely exceeded 200 square feet, and in some 
instances up to fifty people shared a single unisex outhouse.  Curtains formed interior 
walls, and, since few could spare the room to transport furniture, everyone ate, slept, and 
socialized on dirt floors.35 
Cotton growers preferred Tejano laborers over Anglos or African Americans 
because they worked for less money, but also for their reputed work ethic and docility.  
Most Mexicans spoke poor English, if at all, and few fully grasped American concepts 
of civil liberties.  Added to threats of deportation, these factors dissuaded most migrant 
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workers from demanding better living and working conditions.  One farmer who owned 
700 acres complained that poor whites expected decent housing, “better clothes and 
more provisions,” and another observer concurred that “the Mexican works for less, he 
can be supervised more easily, and the problem of labor is solved by his working the 
whole family and living in conditions which the American farmer would not tolerate.”  
Moreover, these characteristics prevented other ethnic groups, such as Greeks and 
Italians, from gaining a foothold in Texas agriculture as they had in other parts of the 
U.S.36 
Although King Cotton reigned in Texas agriculture through the 1920s and 1930s, 
other crops employed significant numbers of Mexicans as well.  The federal government 
commissioned a survey of migratory workers in 1941 that focused on the community of 
Crystal City, about 115 miles southwest of San Antonio.  The survey revealed that more 
than ninety percent of the town’s residents worked on spinach farms each year.  Most 
spinach laborers toiled as cutters, spending endless hours on their knees “clipping the 
mature plants and sorting out defective leaves.”  Children as young as ten worked in 
spinach fields, and those fourteen and under constituted more than ten percent of the 
workforce.  Once the spinach season ended in May, some workers found jobs in one of 
the state’s numerous onion patches.  Wages for onion work surpassed those for spinach, 
but the season was much shorter.  One onion grower complained about the pay each 
worker received, believing it was “about four bits too much.  He should get about $1 a 
day,” the farmer concluded, “just enough to live on, with maybe a dollar or two to spend. 
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. . . If he is paid any more he won’t work so much or when we need him; he’s able to 
wait around until we have to raise the price above what’s legitimate.”  Even after 
exploiting growers so brazenly, about one-third of Crystal City’s migrant population 
found work picking cotton when the onion season ended.  The remainder left Texas for 
sugar beet fields farther north.37 
Mexican workers willingly traveled to the upper Midwest and Rocky Mountain 
states when sugar beets offered the most financially lucrative opportunities.  Inexpensive 
labor was so scarce in the Great Lakes region that five different employment agencies in 
San Antonio catered to that market.  Tejanos flocked to the beet fields any way they 
could; nearly half drove their own vehicles, and another quarter paid friends or relatives 
for rides.  The rest paid ten dollars per adult and five per child for a spot in the back of a 
truck alongside as many as 40 other workers.  The trucks stopped only for gasoline and 
generally took 48 hours to cover the 1,600 mile route each way.  About five thousand 
Mexicans trekked to the Great Lakes for beet work each year, and another three 
thousand went to Colorado and Wyoming.38 
Those who successfully completed the journey often reaped great rewards.  Most 
of Crystal City’s migratory laborers earned more money in the sugar beet fields than in 
spinach, onions, and cotton combined.  Although workers suffered from poor living 
conditions and often failed to escape the long shadow of segregation even outside the  
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South, beet workers earned at least $200 annually even during the worst of times.  One 
worker in 1938, for example, made $230 during the sugar beet season in Colorado, while 
the other six member of his family collected a total of $440 picking cotton during the 
same period.  Under better conditions, beet workers could earn as much as $650 per 
year.  The federal government buoyed wages for sugar beet workers by subsidizing the 
industry in 1934, but monopolizing refiners kept wages in check.  Along with substantial 
pay, however, came substantial work, and sugar beet fields required two sorts of 
laborers.  Blockers and thinners groomed each plant to maximize yields, while hoers 
loosened the soil to prevent weed infestation.  Each worker tended ten acres for twelve 
hours a day from May through October. Most Mexicans who worked the sugar beet 
fields believed it offered unparalleled opportunities, as evidenced by one survey that 
found they stayed with their employers an average of 2.35 years, far longer than normal 
for seasonal labor.39 
In addition to having the most coveted jobs among migratory laborers, sugar beet 
workers showed greater inclination toward organizing than their cotton, spinach, and 
onion picking brethren.  That tendency met challengers on several fronts, however.  The 
seasonal ebb and flow of labor in different regions made unionization difficult for 
agricultural workers, and the threat of imminent deportation compounded the struggle.  
Federal agents could arrest Mexicans without obtaining warrants, arguing that such a 
lengthy legal procedure would allow mobile illegal immigrants to escape.  The AFL also 
undermined organizing efforts by excluding Mexicans from their unions and Tejano 
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unions from their organization.  In some instances this decision backfired dramatically, 
as Latino strikebreakers crossed AFL picket lines.  Nevertheless, in sugar beet growing 
regions shallow labor pools afforded migratory workers better opportunities to bargain 
with employers.  Tejanos in the Great Lakes region “were particularly susceptible to 
unionism because of their proximity to important industrial areas,” such as Detroit and 
Toledo, according to one government report.  Mexicans enjoyed some organizing 
success in Colorado as well, where they joined the Industrial Workers of the World 
(IWW) beet strike in 1927, and formed their own beet workers’ union the follow year.40 
* * * * * 
By the end of the 1920s, Tejanos had joined the current of urbanizing Americans 
flowing into the nation’s cities.  Many left the fields due to harsh treatment, including 
whippings and inadequate diets, at the hands of their employers.  Mechanization forced 
others off farms and into cities.  For Mexicans in South Texas, San Antonio promised 
both opportunity and familiarity.  That promise was often broken, however.  A study 
commissioned by the city explained that Texas farmers could not support seasonal labor 
for “five to seven months a year, and [left] it to San Antonio to harbor.”  The labor could 
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not “be put to work and it [had] no buying power.  The conditions under which it [lived] 
brought San Antonio ill fame and expense.”41 
Heading into the 1930s, moreover, twenty years of uninterrupted supply had 
filled the reservoir of agricultural workers in Texas to the brim.  Mexicans went to San 
Antonio chiefly for jobs.  As the Depression wore on and jobs became increasingly 
scarce, a broad repatriation campaign forced up to 300,000 Latinos from Texas into 
Mexico.  Some Tejanos voluntarily fled to avoid the trauma of being dragged from their 
homes by immigration officials.  During the same period, however, the Mexican 
population of San Antonio increased.  Migrant workers tired of ceaseless travel accepted 
lower pay in the city in exchange for more time with their families.  Nevertheless, in 
lean times men took to the fields, leaving their wives and children behind to cope with 
travails on the west side.  Urban Tejanos often found themselves exploited by unfettered 
capitalism in occupations that were unfamiliar, unsanitary, and unsafe.  They received 
little assistance of any kind from the local government and endured blatant racism from 
the city’s Anglo population.  While workers of other ethnicities in other areas faced 
similar obstacles, an American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) report suggested 
conditions in San Antonio were particularly dismal, commenting that it was “one of the 
four cities in the United States where repression is so continuous as to clearly stand 
out.”42 
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Like ethnic and racial minorities across the nation, San Antonio’s Tejanos 
contended with a dual labor market that devalued their work and gave little hope of 
economic advancement.  Although border towns employed substantial numbers of 
skilled Mexican workers, few found work in San Antonio.  Additionally, a second 
division in the labor market afflicted Tejanas.  While their ethnicity condemned them to 
menial work, their gender condemned them to the menial work that Mexican men 
avoided.  One contemporary study even suggested that the penalty associated with 
gender suppressed Latinas’ wages more than that associated with their skin color.  On 
average they earned 85 percent of Anglo women’s pay stubs, but made only 42 percent 
of their husbands’, brothers’, and fathers’ incomes.  Latino men had historically 
forbidden their wives from working, and most women, therefore, had little work 
experience outside the home.  Consequently, those women had to accept abysmally low 
wages for unskilled labor.43 
A statistical analysis of jobs held by Tejanas in San Antonio during the 1930s is 
complicated by the system of categorization utilized by the government during that 
period.  The U.S. Department of Labor labeled Mexican women as Anglo, with African 
American being the only other category.  Yet, some reasonable inferences can be made.  
Of 949 female workers classified as “semi-skilled workers in manufacturing and other 
industries” who drew federal relief in March, 1935, only 161 were black.  Tejanas 
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almost certainly formed the remainder, as enterprises of that nature gravitated toward the 
west side.  While African Americans constituted the majority of “domestic and personal 
service workers,” Anglos made up 46 percent.  Again, most of these “Anglos” likely 
came from the Mexican quarter, since white women generally refused such work, and a 
separate survey demonstrated that Tejanas labored outside their homes twice as 
frequently as their Anglo counterparts.44 
All of San Antonio’s Mexican population struggled, however, as substandard 
wages became endemic.  West side employers realized a twenty percent discount from 
their Tejano workforce compared to white laborers performing the same jobs in Dallas 
and Houston.  Furthermore, the city’s business elites actively barred heavy 
manufacturing and industrial enterprises from entering Bexar County for fear that such 
work would foster organized labor, a headache they sought to avoid.  Instead, those 
elites envisioned a local economy based on military spending, tourism, agriculture, and 
light industry.  Of San Antonio’s 1,100 manufacturing ventures, 264 involved food 
products.  Many of these businesses, including a vinegar factory, flour mills, Armour 
and Swift meat packinghouses, and the Delaware Punch bottling facility, employed large 
numbers of Tejanas.  Other Mexican women worked as seamstresses or cigar rollers, 
occupations notorious for piecework.45 
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Male workers on the west side had more options for employment.  While some 
toiled alongside women in food-related ventures, others found jobs in lumber yards, 
furniture factories, and icehouses.  In addition, a train depot utilized by the International 
Great Northern and Missouri, Kansas, and Texas rail lines created hundreds of 
warehouse jobs.  Beyond those opportunities, Mexican men engaged in occupations 
traditionally reserved for their gender, such as machinist, mechanic, and iron worker.  
Yet, the most coveted jobs among Tejanos were in construction.  Expanding army forts 
and air corps bases fueled a construction boom in San Antonio after World War I, and by 
1939 the military poured almost $40 million annually into the city.  Common laborers 
earned as much as thirteen dollars each week, and a lucky few landed jobs on Works 
Projects Administration (WPA) worksites where they had an opportunity to learn a skill.  
Moreover, WPA jobs regularly enforced wage scales set forth under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA), meaning workers could earn three times more money for 
performing the same tasks.  Mexicans so highly regarded such positions that some quit 
jobs as skilled laborers to take WPA positions as common laborers.46 
Enviable construction jobs were the exception, however, and although hundreds 
of ventures offered work on the west side, no single industry in San Antonio employed 
more Mexican labor than pecan shelling.  Pecan workers outnumbered those in any other 
sector, including women’s and children’s garments, cement plants, and meat 
packinghouses.  While the majority of Tejanos arrived in San Antonio looking for work, 
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only two percent came to toil specifically in shelleries.  Pecan workers almost invariably 
lacked marketable job skills, and two-thirds of women shellers surveyed had never been 
employed except as unskilled labor.  Furthermore, all rank-and-file pecan workers were 
Mexican.  Anglos seldom appeared in the shelleries, and those who did performed 
supervisory roles.  Nearly ninety percent of workers shelled pecans, with crackers 
constituting another nine percent and the remainder functioning as washers.  A 
government report conducted just after the 1938 shellers’ strike found that women held 
one-third of full-time shelling jobs, but this number was skewed by the omission of part-
time workers.  Overwhelming anecdotal and photographic evidence from the period 
substantiates that women formed the solid majority of pecan labor.  In addition, 
shelling’s relatively light physical demands opened doors for workers excluded from or 
incapable of any other work.  The elderly, physically challenged, and children as young 
as ten years old expanded the pool of available shellers, further suppressing wages.  At 
the time of the 1938 strike, about forty percent of shellers had worked in the pecan 
industry at least seven years, a testament to the immobility of those snared in an 
occupation that most Mexicans considered a last resort.47 
Inadequate pay topped the list of reasons Mexicans shunned pecan work.  
Shellers made the lowest wages in the city, and earned even less than sharecroppers 
according to one source.  In the late 1920s, pecan workers made about one dollar a day, 
but the Depression drove earnings down as enterprises such as Southern Pecan slashed 
pay to ensure profits.  Wages fluctuated throughout the 1930s, but workers typically 
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received between four and seven cents for each pound of shelled halves, with broken 
pieces garnering a penny less per pound.  The most skilled shellers finished each shift 
with about ten pounds worth of earnings, six of which were halves.  Average laborers, 
on the other hand, only shelled between three and six pounds each shift.  Wages hit 
bottom over the 1933-34 shelling season, when many took home less than a dollar each 
week.  By 1938, the average weekly paycheck totaled $2.73, compared to $3.50 for 
agricultural workers in the region.  The mean income of pecan shelling families that year 
was $251, and fewer than two percent made more than $900.  About one-quarter of 
shelling families supplemented their income by picking cotton or, if lucky, sugar beets.  
Few shellers could afford cars, however, and exorbitant transportation costs offered by 
labor agents usually precluded more lucrative work.48 
Like most agricultural ventures, pecan work followed seasonal rhythms.  
Shelling in San Antonio ran from October through May, and peaked during the 
Thanksgiving and Christmas holidays.  Depending on pecan prices and demand, the 
industry typically employed between ten and twenty thousand shellers each winter and 
spring.  Pecan concerns also implemented a duplicitous contract system designed around 
hand shelling that exempted the largest operators, including Southern Pecan, from hiring 
pecan workers directly.  Under this system, large operators harvested pecans from their 
own land or bought them from growers, then shipped the nuts to San Antonio.  Those 
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operators then sold the pecans, still in their shells, to one of the city’s hundreds of 
contractors.  Once at the contractors’ facilities, the pecans were soaked in water 
overnight to moisturize the meats, dried until the shells were rigid, and cracked with 
hand operated machines that often took years to master.  The cracked nuts then went to 
shellers who carefully removed the meats and separated them into halves and pieces.  
Cleaners placed the meats onto screens that sifted out dirt and debris.  Contractors only 
compensated shellers for what remained on the screen, collectively costing workers tens 
of thousands of dollars each year as fine particles of pecan meal fell through the mesh 
and directly onto the contractors’ bottom lines.  Finally, workers packaged the meats in 
50-pound boxes, 5 pound cartons, or smaller, vacuum sealed cans or jars that were sold 
back to the operator for distribution.  The contract system projected the illusion of free 
enterprise at work, but in reality the operators dictated the terms of both sale and 
purchase to the contractors.  Operators thus set wages for pecan workers by proxy.49 
 Working conditions in shelleries corresponded to the level of pay.  One man 
who labored in a shellery as a boy remembered being “packed wall to wall, shoulder to 
shoulder with people sitting at benches to shell the pecans – old people, young people, 
children from the earliest age, sick people, well people, bad people, good people.”  
Furthermore, he claimed that “whole families . . . worked there 10, 12, 14 hours daily to 
together bring home enough to keep body and soul together.”  Government reports also 
bear out the oppressive conditions shellers endured.  Open doors and windows provided 
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the only lighting and ventilation, but they could only be left ajar during nice weather.  
City health ordinances exempted small contractors from providing toilet facilities until 
1936, and after that date employers only had to provide a single restroom for all 
employees.  To make extra money, workers often brought cracked pecans home for the 
whole family to shell overnight.  The nuts were soaked with water to prevent splintering, 
but the water added weight that penalized shellers when they returned with only meats 
the next morning.  Operators subtracted the weight of the dry meats from an expected 
yield based on the weight of the wet pecans that the workers took home, and charged 
shellers the difference for presumably eaten pecans.  The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
expounded on the plight of pecan workers in 1936, concluding in one report that 
“standards for industrial homeworkers have not been raised to anything approaching the 
level of factory standards.  Earnings, whether measured by the hour or the week, are 
extremely low, inhumanly long hours are still permitted, and child labor is still prevalent 
. . . where children can profitably be employed.”50 
* * * * * 
The tidal wave of immigration from Mexico into Texas between 1910 and 1930 
dramatically increased the state’s Tejano population at a time when Anglos from outside 
of Texas also surged into the area.  Prejudices and economic circumstances bred 
discrimination against the Mexican community, resulting in a two-tiered labor market 
that subjected Tejanos to low wages, long hours, and poor working conditions.  Entering 
                                                 
50 Menefee and Cassemore, Pecan Shellers, 10; Ruben Munguia, “The Nuecero Spoke,” booklet, 1982, 
Texas AFL-CIO Miscellany Collection, 1888-1985, SC-UTA (first and second quotes); U.S. Department 
of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 616 (Washington, D. C.:  
Government Printing Office, 1936), 200 (third quote). 
  
  
44
 
the 1930s Mexican laborers began asserting their rights in the workplace, but disaffected 
workers alone explain neither the timing nor the success of the pecan shellers’ strike that 
occurred in 1938.  Working conditions in the 1920s, after all, were scarcely better, and 
Texas experienced few work stoppages during that decade.  Moreover, the world of 
Tejano laborers remains partially obscured by simply examining their experiences at 
work.  To further understand the degree to which Mexicans in San Antonio suffered 
from discrimination during the Depression, their lives outside of the workplace also need 
to be explored. 
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CHAPTER III 
EDUCATION AND LIFE 
By the 1930s, San Antonio had developed an identity crisis.  While the city 
published brochures that touted the west side as “Mexico itself,” where “shops, theaters, 
[and] homes offer colorful contrast to the American mode of life,” and local 
businessmen promoted the neighborhood as a place to “see re-created the life of another 
world and another day,” critics often told another story.  The manifold problems that 
plagued the shellers in San Antonio’s Mexican quarter led one journalist to describe the 
area as “one of the foulest slum districts in the world.”  Another contemporary 
chronicled the barrio’s troubles in more detail.  A local resident and columnist explained 
that the west side was “notorious for its crimes of violence, its filthy and disease ridden 
red-light district, its pecan shelling sweatshops, its illegal gambling dens, and its four-
mile square Mexican slum, often mentioned as the worst in America.”  Similarly, a 
fourth informant proclaimed the neighborhood’s wretched living conditions without peer 
in North America, a sentiment echoed decades later by historian Richard Garcia, who 
called the west side the “Paris of the Southwest urban barrios.”  Discrimination and 
racial prejudice toward Tejanos underpinned the quality of life on the west side.  
Mexican children uniformly received substandard educations that condemned them to 
low-paying jobs and lives of virtual peonage.  Small paychecks ensured residence in 
shacks that typically lacked utilities, but abounded in access to liquor, gambling, and 
prostitution.  Nonexistent infrastructure and inadequate municipal services led to disease 
and infant mortality rates unknown elsewhere in the country.  If conditions in the 
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workplace failed to produce sufficient animosity amongst San Antonio’s pecan shellers 
to prompt a strike, then conditions in their harsh Mexican ghetto surely did.51  
* * * * * 
Educational inequality provided a foundation for broader discrimination against 
pecan shellers and other Tejanos.  Although state law allowed Mexican children to 
attend white schools, most found themselves in segregated institutions.  By 1930, nearly 
ninety percent of Tejano students checked in to exclusively Mexican schools or 
classrooms each day.  Elementary schools in particular enforced strict segregation, since 
few Mexicans progressed beyond that level of education.  Regardless of the classroom’s 
ethnic makeup, instructors always taught in English, as dictated by state law.  
Occasionally districts employed Mexican teachers, but Anglos held a large majority of 
positions in all schools.  In the late 1920s at San Antonio’s Washington Irving Junior 
High School, test scores determined which classes students would attend.  This system 
also resulted in ethnic segregation, as Mexicans invariably scored lower than the Anglos 
in their cohort.  The principal at Washington Irving defended this practice, suggesting 
that segregation allowed Tejano children to develop leadership skills that would have 
remained dormant in the company of whites.  He further characterized racial relations in 
his schools as harmonious, although he admitted that students tended to socialize within 
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their own ethnic groups.  Rural Tejano children suffered greater problems.  As farmland 
consolidated into fewer white hands, Mexican agricultural workers increasingly replaced 
Anglo tenant farmers.  The remaining landowners had little interest in financing 
predominantly Tejano schools with their property taxes, thus local funding often 
evaporated through bond measures.  Furthermore, the state disproportionately funded 
white schools, leaving Mexican children to work with minimal resources in substandard 
facilities.52 
Overcrowding and under funding topped the list of problems that hindered 
schools on the west side.  The neighborhood’s eleven public schools housed more than 
12,000 students, 3,200 more than state guidelines allowed.  On average, those schools 
spent $24.50 per year on each of the 48 children in a typical classroom.  In contrast, 
Anglo schools spent almost $36 each year per child, and classes averaged 33 students.  
In 1934, the League of United Latin American Citizens’ (LULAC) Educational 
Committee recommended to the San Antonio School Board that the west side needed 88 
new elementary classrooms, as well as an entire junior high school, to relieve 
overcrowding.  The committee went on to accuse the school board of “spending in 
schools situated in other [i.e. white] sections of the District funds that lawfully belonged 
to the children of the western section of the city.”  Their accusation was corroborated by 
the $350,000 profit the district made each year running west side schools, money that 
rarely found its way back into Mexican classrooms.  After gaining little ground with 
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officials in San Antonio, the committee contacted the State Superintendent of Public 
Instruction, who promised to “make further investigation into the Mexican children of 
[their] territory,” and avoid being “a party in hurting the Latin-American children of San 
Antonio.”  Nevertheless, segregated education continued in San Antonio through the 
1930s.53   
At the same time, an educational paradox existed on the west side.  Chronic 
overcrowding was tempered by absenteeism, a problem that became more acute as 
Mexican children matriculated from one grade to the next.  Municipal school authorities 
in 1931 revealed that 56 percent of elementary school children in San Antonio had 
Spanish surnames.  By junior high, only 22 percent had such names, and in the city’s 
high schools the number plummeted to nine percent.  Of 546 Mexican men surveyed a 
few years earlier, 524 had less than eight years of schooling, and 367 had fewer than 
four.  Latinas faced an even bleaker situation.  Female enrollment in Tejano schools 
trailed that of males at every grade level in 1930.  Many Mexicans considered educating 
girls superfluous, since families expected young women to marry and start families 
while still in their teens.54 
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Nonetheless, Mexican children usually missed school in order to work, many of 
them in the city’s shelleries.  Parental wages rarely supported an entire family, pulling 
adolescents into the workforce.  Since the harvest time table, rather than academic 
calendars, dictated the work schedule of agricultural labor, migrating families typically 
missed both the beginning and the end of the school year.  In San Antonio, for example, 
school began the first of September and ran through the following May.  Children in 
migratory families often returned to school in November, once the final harvest ended, 
and went south the following April to follow the cycle of crops once again.  In one west 
side school, average attendance in September lingered near 200, but by December 
reached as many as 1,200.  Such sporadic attendance ensured Mexican children would 
not receive enough education to break the chains of the secondary labor market.55    
Some Anglos wondered why the children of migrant workers bothered with 
school at all.  The author of one 1931 article made the case that “farmers want their 
labor, the parents their children’s earnings, it costs money and effort to put them into 
school, and causes a lot of disturbance after they get there.  If you think Mexican 
children should have the pressure of the American state behind their education, it is a 
‘problem.’  If you do not, their non-attendance may mitigate local difficulties in getting 
the kind of farm labor you have a hard time finding anyone else to do.”  The children of 
migratory laborers held no monopoly on work, however.  Most students on the west side 
worked after school in neighborhood businesses, including shelleries, and long hours 
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contributed to absenteeism.  Only 55 percent of children who worked as shellers during 
the 1938-9 school year attended from September through May, and only 62 percent 
attended even part of the year.  The typical adult pecan worker dropped out of school in 
the fifth grade, and none of the 82 shellers surveyed in a 1940 federal report had passed 
beyond tenth grade.56 
Some Anglos dismissed such statistics as a cultural deficiency, or rationalized 
that Mexicans found school burdensome.  One farm manager in the early 1930s claimed 
that Mexicans were “a happy people . . . they don’t want responsibility, they want just to 
float along, sing songs, smoke cigarettes.  Education doesn’t make them any happier; 
most of them continue the same sort of work at the same wages as if they had never 
attended school.”  Later in his interview, however, this informant’s more deeply seeded 
reservations surfaced.  Education, he believed, “only makes them dissatisfied, and 
teaches them to read the wrong kind of literature (I.W.W.) and listen to the wrong kind 
of talk.”  Nevertheless, others believed Tejanos placed considerable emphasis on 
education, and considered Tejano children well-suited to academic work.  One 
contemporary scholar reported that Mexican parents showed “a decided interest in the 
schooling of their offspring, in some instances amounting to a passion.  The children 
themselves are almost addicted to it – voluntary truancy is quite unknown. . . . Teachers 
seldom complain of the Mexican children, they are usually obedient and appreciative, 
with a tendency to show extreme devotion.”  Even prior to the Mexican Revolution, a 
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U.S. government official witnessed that “the Mexicans of San Antonio show an interest 
in the public schools.”  Contrary to popular opinion at the time, many Tejanos 
understood the importance of educating their children.57 
By the mid-1930s, moreover, many began to fight for better education.  The 
League of United Latin American Citizens’ (LULAC) Committee on Public School 
Buildings and Recreational Facilities argued that equitable access to education was an 
issue of “justice, equal rights, and fairness.”  They argued that a well-schooled Mexican 
population would “grow up to become an asset to our community . . . that we may 
safeguard the governmental institutions for which our forefathers fought and bled.”  
Disappointed, the committee disbanded when it failed to win financial support from the 
Mexican business community or upper class.  Eluiterio Escobar resigned as chair and 
venomously attacked his fellow Tejanos on his way out.  “We wonder,” he wrote, “why 
we don’t have a voice or representation in our City, County or State Government, we 
wonder why our race is the most inferior – and acting as thus we pay from $5.00 to 
$10.00 to see a discrimination fight in Goliad, Corpus Christi or Del Rio, while we have 
discrimination right here in our own City.”  Although segregation continued after the 
committee disbanded, working- and middle-class Mexicans demonstrated that they could 
cultivate organizations and leaders capable of making their issues heard without external 
                                                 
57 Clark, Mexican Labor, 508-9 (fourth quote); Handman, “Mexican Immigrant,” 38-9 (third quote); 
Taylor, “Mexicans North,” 200 (first and second quotes). 
  
 51
support.  This capability proved crucial in the shellers’ initial efforts to organize in the 
months preceding the strike.58 
Despite the popularity of segregation among Anglos, some educators 
acknowledged the potential of Mexican students.  One Nueces County teacher 
represented the view that “if the Mexicans were brought up with an equal force of 
primary teachers, and were not overcrowded, the majority would probably be equal to 
the whites.”  Others looked outside of the classroom for factors contributing to under 
performance.  University of Texas professor Max S. Handman discovered that Tejanos 
in urban schools outperformed their rural Anglo counterparts on standardized tests, 
suggesting that the rural-urban divide contributed more to scores than ethnicity.  
Sociologist and Mexican national Manuel Gamio similarly concluded that perceived 
Mexican limitations were “probably affected by racial attitudes and by a translation into 
terms of mental competence of differences in economic and cultural position.”  Even 
Anglos who considered themselves inherently more intelligent often admitted that 
Tejanos could overcome biological differences with hard work.  Generally, educators 
believed Mexican children excelled in subjects that allowed them to use their hands, 
specifically art, home economics, and manual arts, such as “auto painting, sheet and 
metal work, acetylene welding, woodwork, forging, and job-printing.”  Prejudice notions 
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of Mexicans as fit only for domestic work and manual labor undoubtedly informed those 
beliefs and explain, in part, the preponderance of Tejano shellers.59 
* * * * * 
Meanwhile, most Anglos simply failed to see the point of educating a permanent 
laboring class.  This attitude locked Mexicans into the poorly-compensated secondary 
labor sector, which in turn dictated where and how they could afford to live.  Low-
quality housing was perhaps the most visible facet of poverty on the west side.  About 
two-thirds of the city’s Mexican population lived in the neighborhood’s tenements, 
where most paid between fifty cents and one dollar in rent each week.  Anglo investors 
owned most of the rental units, known as corrales, although Tejanos gave them colorful 
names.  Urban geography helped established some monikers, such as Freight Train 
Alley, while the local fauna undoubtedly inspired the naming of Rat Alley.  Pecan 
shellers filled west side corrales, as they could not afford to live anywhere else in the 
city.60 
Housing, although decrepit, was remarkably uniform.  Rows of corrales typically 
bordered all four sides of a property, creating a courtyard in the center.  Clothes lines 
crossed the courtyard, as laundry was a daily chore for Mexicans who owned few 
garments.  One reporter testified to the quality of corrales by describing the units as 
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“wooden boxes, slapped together with half- and quarter-inch boards and set up under 
one roof,” which in some cases was less than six feet high.  Heywood Braun, a columnist 
from New York, was skeptical about the severity of housing on the west side until he 
visited in person.  “It seems devilish,” he wrote his office, “that one crazy combination 
of old lumber and stray tin should be set as a flap upon the side of another equally 
discreditable.  I did not quite comprehend the character of the alley,” he confessed, “until 
I discovered that what I took to be a toolhouse was a residence for a family of eleven 
people.”  The worst units had no windows, limiting both light and ventilation and 
trapping unpleasant barrio odors inside of dark Mexican homes.  More importantly, lack 
of air circulation afforded infectious airborne diseases an inviting atmosphere in which 
to thrive.  This affected pecan shellers in particular, since shelleries offered similarly 
dusty, stagnant environments.61 
The interiors of homes on the west side were no more impressive than the 
exteriors.  A housing ordinance passed in San Antonio in 1936 stated that dwellings 
must have “at least . . . 400 square feet of space for every person above twelve years of 
age,” but that requirement was rarely, if ever, met in the Mexican quarter.  In an average 
unit, 4.6 people shared 2.2 rooms, although 46 percent of houses had only one or two 
rooms.  Rooms could be as small as eight feet square, meaning that even three room 
apartments could total less than two hundred square feet of living space.  Most corrales 
had dirt floors covered with scrap materials dug from the garbage bins of local 
businesses.  Because west side residents migrated less than their rural counterparts, some 
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managed to accumulate furnishings.  Manuel Gamio described the typical dwelling, 
where furniture was “of cheap American manufacture, bought on the instalment [sic] 
plan, and very frequently even in a poor house there is a phonograph or piano.  The 
decoration,” he continued, was “usually of religious pictures and saints, Mexican 
pictures or postals, Mexican flags, portraits of Mexican heros [sic] – Hidalgo, Juarez, 
and Madero.”  Although many Tejanos acquired phonographs, pianos, and other material 
conveniences that their contemporaries in rural Mexico could not afford, their levels of 
material accumulation lagged behind those of Anglos in urban areas.62 
In addition to stipulating interior space requirements, the 1936 housing ordinance 
ordered that dwellings must have “hydrants, sinks, water closets, sewer connections” and 
baths to ensure the “health and comfort of the tenants.”  Yet, indoor plumbing and 
electricity were almost entirely absent on the west side.  Some argued that Mexican 
immigrants lacked such utility services in Mexico, and, therefore, should not have 
missed them in San Antonio.  That reasoning failed to recognize that homes and 
communities in Mexico were designed to function without those amenities, whereas 
American city planners by the 1930s assumed at least a minimum of services would be 
available.  Moreover, some charged that the federal and state governments apportioned 
less relief funding per capita to Tejanos than Anglos on the basis that the former had 
fewer utility bills to pay.  Only one-quarter of west side homes had electricity, despite its 
relatively cheap availability, and most of those belonged to landlords who feared losing 
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their investments to fire.  Nearly eighty percent of Tejanos in the barrio lit their corrales 
with kerosene lamps, and slightly more cooked their food over open flames fuelled by 
scrap lumber.  Indoor plumbing was equally scarce.  Potable water flowed into fewer 
than one in five homes, and three-quarters of those who had that luxury occupied homes 
built decades earlier for Anglo habitation.  Lack of water inside the home meant that 
most Tejanos neither bathed nor washed their hands regularly, further compounding 
health problems and reinforcing the stereotype of “dirty” Mexicans.  Corrales typically 
wanted for sewage lines, as well, and one study of living conditions in the late 1920s 
found private toilets nonexistent in the tenements.  In some instances, outhouses sat in 
courtyards for use by up to fifty families.  A government report in 1940 demonstrated 
that the situation improved only marginally during the 1930s.  By that date, more than 
ninety percent of homes in the barrio still lacked private toilets.63 
Dilapidated housing was only the most acute symptom of the endemic poverty 
that afflicted shellers, however.  The neighborhood’s infrastructure suffered considerable 
neglect from the city.  One group aiming to promote San Antonio as a center of business 
and tourism touted the city’s modern architecture and claimed that “wide thoroughfares 
and a completely motorized public transportation system preserve the peace and quiet 
that belongs always to a community that respects its age and ancestry.”  This imagery 
contradicted reality in the Mexican quarter, where the most densely populated district 
had only two paved streets and no public transportation.  In other parts of the west side, 
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large businesses that contributed significantly to the city’s tax base commanded paved 
roads, while residential areas that produced little revenue received none.  Beyond 
unpaved streets, the west side lacked paved sidewalks, as well as playgrounds or other 
green spaces.  Consequently, even small rain showers turned the barrio into a muddy, 
stagnant breeding ground for insects and diseases, and, according to one observer, 
created stenches “so varied, and so strong that visitors often [had] to turn back and 
continue their sightseeing in less malodorous parts of the city.” Charles Bellinger, 
professional gambler turned political boss, acted as an advocate for his fellow African 
Americans on the city’s east side.  That neighborhood correspondingly enjoyed 
“adequate light, water, and sewer service . . . numerous public schools, parks and 
playgrounds, fire and police stations, a public library, and a public auditorium.”  To their 
detriment, Tejanos failed to produce a political leader of Bellinger’s stature who could 
similarly protect their interests on the west side.64 
A dearth of adequate shelter and infrastructure on the West Side was exacerbated 
by malnutrition, and the combination produced a multitude of illnesses in San Antonio’s 
Mexican community.  Tejanos’ diets consisted primarily of tortillas and beans, which 
provided enough carbohydrates to fuel their bodies through the workday but failed to 
supply other nutrients essential to good health.  Shellers supplemented their diets with 
pecans, but each bite they took ate into their day’s earnings.  West side residents 
commonly suffered from pellagra and scurvy, diseases closely associated with poor diet, 
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as a result.  Others simply faced starvation.  One Anglo investigating the barrio noted 
driving past “some sort of food-storage house whose refuse was kept in garbage cans a 
foot or so from the sidewalk.”  He admitted that he could “only guess how it must have 
smelled to a skinny little Mexican girl who bent the entire upper half of her body into 
one of the big cans in search of something edible.”  Malnourishment had particularly 
devastating effects on newborns.  Although some blamed Mexicans’ tendency to use 
midwives rather than doctors for high infant mortality rates, several local physicians 
pointed to enteritis, an intestinal disease that leads to dehydration, as the primary culprit.  
Despite heated debate over causation, one fact remained undisputed.  One of every eight 
Mexican children born on the west side in 1938 died before their first birthday.65 
Among the myriad of illnesses that plagued the city’s Tejanos, however, 
tuberculosis proved the most fatal.  The disease spreads most easily between people who 
live or work in close physical proximity to one another and where particulates can hang 
in the air for prolonged periods due to poor ventilation.  San Antonio’s shellers were 
prime candidates for such an endemic.  Thirteen percent of Mexicans who died on the 
west side in 1938 succumbed to the disease, more than double the rate for Anglos.  Low 
incomes and the substandard living conditions they engendered received most of the 
blame.  “The most obvious reason why one Latin American out of twenty was found to 
have tuberculosis is poverty,” wrote Dr. David M. Gould for the U.S. Public Health 
Service.  “These people have been exploited as a source of cheap labor,” he continued.  
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“They have harvested the crops, shell the pecans, wash the clothes, and dig the ditches.  
For this they receive barely enough to keep body and soul together.”66 
Meanwhile, some locals continued to advertise the city’s healthy environment, 
where residents found the “mild climate, dry, clean air and sunshine . . . especially 
beneficial to chronic chest and heart conditions.”  The city government, however, 
recognized that conditions on the west side failed to meet such lofty rhetoric.  A report 
commissioned by city hall concluded that “replacement of 35% of the Latin Americans 
by an equivalent number of economically independent families would transform San 
Antonio . . . in health,” but such a plan was unrealistic given the business community’s 
unquenchable thirst for cheap labor.  Local politicians particularly worried about charges 
of negligence concerning sanitary conditions in the city’s pecan shelleries.  They 
preemptively instituted a program that required a health screening for pecan workers 
every six months.  Yet, the medical examinations amounted to little more than a 
formality, as virtually anyone able to pay the fifty-cent fee could obtain a health card 
without seeing a physician.  One investigative report highlighted the problem, claiming 
that “it is possible for a four-plus syphilitic to obtain a health card . . . to go to work 
shelling pecans by hand for the nation to eat.”67 
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Indeed, the rate of venereal disease surpassed even that of tuberculosis on the 
West Side.  In 1938 two San Antonio doctors, one of whom was a former city health 
officer, estimated that half of the city’s Mexican population suffered from sexually 
transmitted diseases.  This statistic hinted at another problem stemming from economic 
disadvantage in the barrio.  Many women desperate to supplement their incomes turned 
to prostitution.  Estimates in the late 1930s determined that between five hundred and 
two thousand Tejanas engaged in the occupation at any given time on the west side.  
Prostitutes ranged between thirteen and forty-five years of age, and charged customers, 
mostly military personnel from the city’s various installations, as little as a quarter each.  
A contemporary reported that the women worked in “little individual coops,” where they 
sat “on permanent display, one every eight or ten feet, awaiting business, their faces 
grotesque with thick rouge, lipstick, and eyebrow pencil, their bodies revealed by sleazy 
kimonos.”  After negotiating a price, the “door [was] shut, and a blind pulled down, but 
every sound inside the closed stall must [have been] audible through the paper-thin 
partitions.”68   
Like pecan shellers, prostitutes had to obtain health certificates from the city.  
Whereas shellers paid fifty cents every six months, however, sex workers paid two 
dollars each week.  In addition to venereal diseases, prostitutes often endured unwanted 
pregnancies.  “One of the quaint features of our red-light district,” a lifelong San 
Antonian wrote, “is the omnipresence of babies and children. . . . They play in the 
doorways, crawl around on the floors.  It is not unusual to see a woman leering and 
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whistling from a doorway with a dirty, underfed baby staring at the world from between 
her feet.”  Beyond their additional costs, unplanned pregnancies jeopardized the lives of 
expectant mothers.  Mexican women on the west side were five times more likely to die 
from complications during childbirth than their Anglo counterparts.69 
Prostitution was by no means the lone variety of vice in San Antonio’s Mexican 
quarter.  The city had earned a reputation as a center of illicit activity over several 
decades, and its citizens had “drunk freely, gambled, loved and fought freely in the soft 
moonlight” for more than two hundred years according to one witness.  Evangelist Dixie 
Williams purportedly once said that “San Antonio is the wickedest city in the Union, not 
excepting Washington City, which is the wickedest outside of Hell.”  Some municipal 
officials took an equally dim view of San Antonio’s seedy reputation.  Dr. Adolph 
Berchelmann, chairman of the City Health Board, lamented that San Antonio was 
“associated with Shanghai as the most open vice city in the world!”  Poker, craps, and 
other games of chance permeated the barrio, and even young boys gambled for pennies 
on the street corners.  Evidence indicates that despite public statements to the contrary, 
the city government tolerated vice on the west side, likely in hopes that it would not 
spread into other areas of town.  Despite rampant illegal activity in the barrio, the arrest 
rate for Mexicans was only half that for African Americans.  The police even arrested 
Anglos seventy-five percent more often than Tejanos.  Ironically, promoters often 
advertised San Antonio as a place where “desire finds complete gratification” and 
visitors could “relax or play as they want.”  Although such promotions rarely mentioned 
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the west side explicitly, the neighborhood’s reputation for vice likely attracted visitors as 
well.70 
* * * * * 
Racist attitudes and discriminatory practices affected Tejanos in their lives 
outside of work as well as on the job.  Segregation kept Mexican children in 
understaffed and under funded schools.  The great majority of students left those schools 
for low-paying jobs in fields or factories before graduating.  Small incomes condemned 
Mexicans in San Antonio to the west side, where makeshift corrales and nonexistent 
infrastructure contributed to unsanitary conditions that fostered the highest rates of 
tuberculosis and infant mortality in the nation.  Most of the city’s Tejanos battled on a 
daily basis to overcome crushing poverty. 
Against this background, the portrait of the shellers’ strike comes into better 
focus.  Pecan workers struggling to feed, house, and care for their families could ill 
afford even the one-penny pay cut operators implemented at the beginning of 1938.  Yet, 
the shellers had suffered through pay cuts before and could not muster the wherewithal 
to strike for a prolonged period.  By 1938, however, those shellers could see that most 
San Antonians largely ignored living conditions on the west side and were content to see 
starvation and disease decimate the city’s Mexican population.  Barrio residents realized 
that outside help in their struggles would not be forthcoming and that meaningful 
changes could only be initiated from within the community.  In fact, Mexicans in San 
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Antonio had been developing networks of solidarity through formal and informal clubs, 
organizations, and activities that proved essential in the pecan shellers’ victory. 
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CHAPTER IV 
SOLIDARITY 
By the late 1930s, nearly 100,000 of San Antonio’s Mexicans lived in abject 
poverty.  This condition provided shellers a reason to demand higher wages from 
employers, but not a means for achieving that goal.  To successfully challenge the city’s 
pecan operators, pecan workers had to act collectively.  Unlike laborers in other 
industries, such as garment workers and cigar rollers, pecan shellers rarely worked 
alongside one another in large numbers.  The industry’s contract system gave rise to 
hundreds of shelleries across the west side that employed the majority of pecan workers.  
Under this arrangement, according to one U.S. Department of Labor official, large 
operators “avoided the direct responsibility of an employer and reaped the advantages of 
sub-standard wage rates and low labor cost.”  Moreover, this economic model hindered 
cultivation of traditional workplace solidarity by keeping pecan workers physically 
separated.  The shellers overcame that hindrance by drawing on reservoirs of solidarity 
accumulated over many years through participation in formal and informal organizations 
and activities.71 
Any number of circumstances or events can obscure the often invisible process 
of solidarity formation.  Although solidarity constitutes the glue that holds groups 
together, its strength remains unknown until tested by external challengers.  Several 
scholars have examined solidarity formation under adverse conditions and developed 
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frameworks that lend insight to the case of San Antonio’s pecan shellers.  Vicki Ruiz’s 
study of Latina cannery workers in California reveals some mechanisms of shop-floor 
solidarity formation.  She found that women working next to one another built 
relationships that spanned cultures and ethnicities by conversing about movies, their 
families, fashions, and other topics unrelated to their jobs.  Richard Griffin’s work on 
South Texas farm workers further demonstrates the ability of marginalized groups to 
form solidarity on the job, emphasizing “the primacy of intangible, internal resources to 
movements among the deprived and powerless.”  He argues that “elites do not make 
concessions to protestors solely on the basis of historical mandates.  They make 
concessions because they are beaten in the streets and at the line of confrontation by 
resources they can not control, often do not understand, and can not co-opt.”  Karl von 
Holdt’s essay on black South African steel workers reveals alternative paths to solidarity 
under oppressive conditions.  “Union social structure,” he contends “is permeable to 
processes of identity formation beyond the workplace, in addition to those that arise 
within the workplace itself.”  Similarly, San Antonio’s pecan shellers developed a 
culture of solidarity, defined by sociologist Rick Fantasia as a culture that arises “in 
conflict, creating and sustaining solidarity in opposition to the dominant structure.”  
Taken together, these arguments demonstrate that solidarity formation need not center 
on social or political rhetoric, that it does not require external allies, and that it can occur 
both inside of and outside of the workplace.  As in these cases, the pecan shellers 
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overcame physical isolation and a lack of resources and formed enough solidarity to 
successfully challenge their employers.72 
* * * * * 
In San Antonio, solidarity formation outside of the workplace adopted a variety 
of guises.  Mexican workers forged cultural solidarity through both formal organizations 
and less formalized recreational activities.  Among the formal organizations that aided 
workers in creating solidarity, three stand above the rest:  the Catholic Church, mutual 
aid societies (mutualistas), and, to a lesser degree, the League of United Latin American 
Citizens (LULAC).  The Catholic Church claimed the allegiance of most Mexicans on 
the west side.  The San Antonio Archdiocese, headed by Archbishop Arthur J. 
Drossaerts, was immense in both size and influence.  Its 120 churches housed more than 
200,000 communicants, about one-quarter of the state’s total, and covered almost 40,000 
square miles of territory.  After the pace of Mexican immigration to the United States 
accelerated following Mexico’s 1910 Revolution, the Church increased its compliment 
of priests in Texas.  Few of the new clergymen, however, were Latin American.73 
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Largely because of the dearth of Latino priests during the period, some scholars 
have questioned the Church’s influence on Tejano solidarity formation.  Jay Dolan and 
Gilberto Hinojosa conclude that “the local Church’s reluctance to grapple with social 
issues deterred many Mexican immigrants from reaching out to the Church and making 
it the center of their community in the way other immigrants had.”  One survey 
conducted on the west side revealed that while 88 percent of its residents identified as 
Catholic, only 38 percent attended mass at least weekly, an indication that the Church’s 
role as a cultural symbol outweighed its influence in the community.  Contemporary 
accounts corroborate this point, as witnesses observed that most Tejanos tempered their 
Catholicism with a healthy dose of indigenous belief.  Moreover, the Church had been 
losing its stranglehold on Christianity in the barrio since the 1920s, when at least five 
Protestant churches conducted Spanish-language services on the west side.  Conflict 
between Father Carmelo Tranchese, parish priest over the barrio’s Our Lady of 
Guadalupe Church, and Archbishop Drossaerts further handicapped the Church’s efforts 
to attract and maintain parishioners, particularly since many Mexicans viewed the clergy 
with a wary eye.  While Drossaerts supported the idea of a west side parish dedicated to 
the Virgin of Guadalupe, he did not want it to become the city’s Mexican parish.  
Instead, he hoped to limit membership to those residing within the parish’s geographic 
boundaries.  Tranchese, on the other hand, consistently supported Mexican efforts to 
attend his church, regardless of address.  This conflict persisted until 1941, when a more 
flexible Robert Emmet Lucey replaced Drossaerts as Archbishop of San Antonio.74 
                                                 
74 Dolan and Hinojosa, Mexican Americans and the Church, 45 (quote), 79 Manuel Gamio, Mexican 
  
 67
Yet, despite the lack of Latinos in the Church’s hierarchy, the institution, 
scholars have noted, continued “to be the meeting place for a large segment of the wider 
Mexican community,” particularly for women.  The San Antonio Archdiocese sponsored 
several organizations that welcomed Tejano members, including the Holy Name Society, 
the Altar Society, the Agony Society, and the Christ the King Society.  Women’s 
participation in these societies caused little stir because most viewed the groups as 
apolitical.  Nevertheless, researchers have argued that such societies provided female 
members “with ‘safe’ opportunities outside the home, including opportunities to 
socialize with other women and to exercise leadership and management skills.”  Those 
skills proved invaluable to the women who participated in the work stoppages that 
became routine on the west side in the years preceding the shellers’ strike.75 
The city’s Mexicans did not confine themselves to participation in Church-
related organizations, however.  While the Church remained central to Tejano identity, 
some joined secular associations that had a variety of goals, which included ending 
discrimination against Mexicans and supporting families that faced financial 
catastrophies.  Notably, these groups received little to no assistance from outside of the 
community, and they allowed west side residents to develop critical recruiting, 
leadership, and organizational skills. 
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In 1929, a faction of the Hijos de America (Sons of America) founded the 
League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) in Corpus Christi, Texas.  The 
Hijos, formed in San Antonio in 1921, limited membership to American citizens of 
Mexican or Spanish descent, and many were small business owners and successful 
professionals.  In contrast, the founders of LULAC opened membership to all American 
citizens and adopted English as the organization’s official language.  Although some 
historians believe that LULAC’s formation indicated the birth of middle-class 
consciousness among Tejanos, the league aspired to goals, including civil rights for 
Mexicans, that benefited all Latinos in the United States.  The organization called on its 
members to adopt “American” values and to become politically engaged, but also 
demanded that Anglos accept cultural pluralism, improve minority schools, and end Jim 
Crow.  One of LULAC’s founders, M. C. Gonzales, identified five specific forms of 
discrimination on which he believed the organization should focus:  segregated schools, 
segregated public facilities, discriminatory housing statutes, the state’s white primary, 
and measures that prohibited Mexicans from serving on juries.  LULAC initially 
experienced more setbacks than successes, but its mere existence demonstrated that the 
Tejano community could establish meaningful advocacy groups on its own behalf.76 
Although LULAC’s middle-class leadership and the Church’s European 
clergymen occasionally championed issues that benefited the working class, pecan 
shellers and other wage earners also worked independently to improve their lots.  Mutual 
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aid societies and related groups ranked among the most successful working-class 
organizations.  Mutualistas began forming in Mexico during the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century.  The earliest mutualistas in San Antonio, Benevolencia Mexicana, 
Sociedad de la Union, and Orden Amigos del Pueble, organized in the 1880s.  Generally, 
these groups originated in Mexico and migrated north with the flow of human traffic.  
Some mutualistas formed around occupations, and members often also belonged to the 
Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) or the Common Laborers’ Union.  San 
Antonio’s mutual aid societies grew in popularity as discrimination increased, 
particularly after the turn of the century when poll taxes excluded most Tejanos from 
political participation.  The largest mutualistas had more than one thousand members, 
but most memberships numbered in the hundreds.  By 1920 ten percent of San Antonio’s 
working class belonged to mutual aid societies.77 
Mutualistas met a variety of needs for poor Mexicans.  According to one 
researcher, the Sociedad de la Union aimed to “attend to the physical and intellectual 
needs of the members; to protect them in case of adversity, sickness, and death; and to 
improve their social condition, without taking any part whatever in any political or 
religious faction.”  Funeral assistance constituted the primary function of most societies 
by covering burial expenses, which averaged ten dollars, and paying survivors as much 
as $600.  The Sociedad de la Union typified the cost of membership in an aid society.  
Each member paid a three dollar enrollment fee, plus 25 cents each week and one dollar 
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upon the death of another member.  In addition, enrollees paid fifty cents each year 
toward the organization’s anniversary celebration.  As treasuries grew, benefits extended 
to compensation for doctors’ bills and wages lost to illness or injury.  One society’s 
bylaws stipulated that after seven years in good standing, members were “entitled 
without cost to a surgical operation, to the application of electric battery-treatments, or to 
vapor baths” to heal their ailments.  Some of the larger mutualistas also provided bail 
and legal support to members charged with crimes.  Beyond these roles, aid societies 
established libraries and newspapers, helped members find jobs, provided small loans, 
organized beauty pageants and picnics, and shared their facilities with the public for 
lectures, boxing matches, and quinceañeras.  More than any other institution, mutualistas 
threw Mexicans a lifeline in their most desperate times.78 
The myriad of services mutualistas performed for their members and the 
community contrasted sharply with the Church’s role on the west side.  The dearth of 
Mexican clergy made it difficult for the Church to make meaningful, personal 
connections with parishioners.  Moreover, upper echelons of the Catholic hierarchy 
excluded Latinos from their ranks.  At the neighborhood level, however, priests and 
other officials often enlisted the help of mutualistas in organizing functions or raising 
donations.  Mutual aid societies occasionally assisted, but their nearly universal bans on 
religious speech limited contact with the Church.  Rather than appealing to poor 
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Mexicans on the basis of faith, mutualistas employed notions of nationalism and race to 
attract members.79 
Mutual aid societies also gave women more opportunities for developing 
organizational and leadership skills than the Church.  Although men tended to dominate 
societies, women commonly participated.  Seven of the nineteen mutualistas extant in 
San Antonio during the 1920s allowed women to hold office, two others had women’s 
auxiliaries, and another pair catered almost exclusively to Tejanas.  Despite the cultural 
stereotype of absolute patriarchy in the Mexican community, men typically respected 
female members as both homemakers and laborers.  Women in aid societies often 
reciprocated that respect by avoiding overtly feminist causes.80 
Most mutualistas did not explicitly concern themselves with workers’ issues, 
although, according to one historian, they sometimes “offered the only safe forum for 
controversial Chicano groups, especially labor unions.”  Wage earners often formed 
independent labor mutualistas that worked in conjunction with traditional aid societies, 
and Tejanos commonly belonged to both types of organizations.  According to one 
scholar, labor mutualistas “helped laborers . . . bargain for improved wages and working 
conditions at a time when unions were regarded as conspiracies against both employer 
and society.”  Skilled workers, such as plumbers and carpenters, disproportionately 
populated labor mutualistas because they could more easily afford the regular dues.  
These workers constituted nearly half of the membership in labor mutualistas, while 
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unskilled laborers formed another thirty percent.  Despite their relatively large numbers 
of skilled workers, both the treasuries and membership totals of these societies remained 
smaller than those of traditional aid societies.81 
Labor mutualistas worked to protect their members’ interests, but most tended to 
be conservative.  They rarely called for strikes or walkouts, and few evolved into full-
fledged unions.  Several Latinos, including José María Mora and Sara Estela Ramírez, 
did attempt, however, to use mutualistas as vehicles for organizing workers.  These 
organizers highlighted the theme of ethnic unity that undergirded all mutual aid efforts.  
Like leaders in traditional societies, they considered solidarity “a condition for growth 
and development and a source of political power essential for social change.”  Even 
more than the Church and LULAC, mutual aid societies represented the interests of the 
working class and exemplified the creativity and effort that Mexicans mustered to 
improve their own conditions.82 
* * * * * 
Informal gatherings complimented formal organizations in fostering ethnic unity 
and working-class solidarity.  Annual festivals dotted the Tejano community’s calendar 
as did periodic celebrations, such as weddings.  Leisure activities provided opportunities 
for building camaraderie through shared cultural experiences and allowed shellers and 
other workers to congregate outside of the workplace on a regular basis.  Closer 
examination of these informal gatherings exposes another means by which Tejano 
laborers, including the pecan workers, built solidarity outside of work. 
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Annual festivals occurred as both religious and secular affairs.  Religious 
festivals typically centered on Catholic traditions, but often adopted a decidedly 
Mexican flavor.  The Christmas season encompassed many of these celebrations, 
including the feast day for the Virgin of Guadalupe (December 12) and activities 
commemorating the birth of Jesus Christ.  The Virgin’s feast day included a whirlwind 
of activity.  One contemporary account explained that San Antonio’s Tejano population 
would “go to Mass, present religious drama, march in procession, stage a cockfight, 
offer pagan dances, and sing mañanitas at dawn.” Similarly, the ritual of Las Posadas 
commemorated the struggles Mary and Joseph endured while seeking shelter in 
Bethlehem.  Closer to Christmas day, the faithful attended and performed in the play Los 
Pastores, which always premiered at Our Lady of Guadalupe before spreading into other 
venues, including back yards.  The comedic performance depicted the nativity story, and 
featured “a lazy shepherd, who refuses to go with his comrades to find the manger.”  The 
actors practiced after the workday ended, and each made their own costumes, “the result 
sometimes being a spangled shepherd or an angel with six-foot wings of crepe paper 
ruffles.”  The play was simple and unchanging, but these characteristics masked its 
greater cultural function.  According to musicologist Manuel H. Peña, the play was “a 
communal event designed to cement reciprocal relations between the members of the 
cast, who themselves [were] barrio residents, and the audiences.”  Moreover, the play 
served as a “symbol whose principal function [was] to ‘re-center’ the community in a 
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common gesture of cooperation and reciprocity, free of the coercion that underlies social 
relations under wage-labor.”83   
Christmas did not exercise a complete monopoly over religious festivals, 
however.  At the beginning of each November, west side Catholics celebrated All Saints’ 
Day to remember those who died as children.  On the following day, known as All 
Souls’ Day (Día de los Muertos), Tejanos would “flock by the thousands to the graves of 
their dead, to decorate them with flowers of the season,” yet “outside the cemetery walls 
[were] the sights and smells of a Mexican fiesta:  cabrito (young goat) roasting over 
charcoal, tamales for sale” and “merry-go-round rides for the children.”  Besides these 
occasions, Mexicans participated in elaborate Easter processions, as well as the annual 
Blessing of the Animals.  During the latter ceremony, a priest asked for blessings over 
dogs, cats, and other assembled pets to “preserve their bodies and save them from all 
hardship.”84 
The most important secular festivals on the west side involved important events 
in Mexican history.  The two most prominent were Cinco de Mayo (May 5) and 
Mexican Independence Day (September 16).  The former commemorated a Mexican 
military victory over the French in 1862.  The latter, although less known in the U.S.,  
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celebrated the end of Spanish rule in Mexico, and it was “dedicated to patriotism and 
pleasure” with “speeches, concerts, and dances.”  One witness explained that during this 
fiesta “all kinds of tempting foods and liquid refreshments are sold, and various wheels 
of fortune and many other kinds of games of chance afford thrills and excitement to 
great numbers whose innate instinct prompt them to spend their money freely for the 
possibility of winning some coveted prize.”  These holidays enjoyed great popularity 
because they promoted cultural and national pride.  Mutualistas often sponsored secular 
fiestas, further cementing unity within the barrio.85 
While annual holidays provided the steady beat by which residents of the west 
side marked time, sporadic celebrations provided impromptu occasions for revelry and 
solidarity building.  Weddings, wakes, anniversaries, and other gatherings allowed 
Latinos to strengthen ties with each other in culturally rich settings.  According to one 
historian, such events “heightened the Mexican workers’ sense of community, their 
sense of Mexicanness, and provided a consciousness of joy in a life of toil, misery, and 
depression.”  Moreover, these celebrations encouraged total participation, as everyone 
felt obligated to take part in the festivities.86 
Anniversaries, weddings, and birthdays frequently resulted in evenings of great 
amusement, but funerals and wakes also presented opportunities to display unity, albeit 
under somber circumstances.  Wakes typically involved hundreds of visitors, as families 
were large and relatives often lived within close proximity of one another.  Furthermore, 
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mutualistas often required members to either attend funeral ceremonies or face fines as 
high as several dollars.  One observer reported that after a body had been prepared for 
burial, it was “viewed by streams of relatives and friends who call to show their respect.  
During the night an old-fashioned wake is held.  Never fewer than half a dozen, and 
often considerably more, of the male friends keep vigil . . . and the gathering often 
assume the appearance to a passerby of a reception rather than of a solemn watch.”87 
Weddings offered opportunities for families to congregate under more pleasant 
conditions.  Civil marriages often preceded religious ceremonies for financial reasons, 
and in Mexico many forewent church weddings entirely.  Most couples on the west side, 
however, could save enough to eventually afford the Church’s twenty-dollar fee.  
Tejanos commonly married Mexican nationals, but unions with Anglos were rare.  Some 
Tejanos constructed bridges between families without marriages.  “This relationship of 
‘compadres,’ or ‘co-fathers,’” noted one scholar, was “the basis of Mexican social 
intercourse.  It is the binding element of their friendships, and is a virtual adoption of 
blood relationships.”  The compadre arrangement required commitment from both 
families, as certain responsibilities, such as paying for adolescent baptisms, were 
considered an obligation of the adopted family.  Weddings, funerals, and compadre 
relationships reinforced cultural values, which in turn fortified social relationships on the 
west side.  These relationships proved instrumental in forming the solidarity utilized by 
pecan shellers in their 1938 strike.88 
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Planned celebrations and festivals represented peaks in the social lives of 
Tejanos, but more mundane recreational activities played critical roles in preserving 
unity throughout the year.  Some forms of recreation were gender-specific, but others, 
including movies, music, and dancing, allowed participation by both sexes and all ages.  
Despite low wages, most people managed to save enough money for an occasional 
respite from their daily struggles. 
The most common forms of recreation on the west side involved separate male 
and female spheres.  Men rarely congregated in the home, opting instead to imbibe with 
friends in one of the dozens of bars, pool halls, and taverns that populated the barrio.  
Cockfighting enjoyed a considerable following, and according to one informant “the 
feathered combatants, aided and abetted by the surrounding owners and other interested 
spectators” would “engage in a fierce struggle” until “one of the cocks [succumbed] to 
the fatal stroke given by his pugnacious antagonist.”  After receiving the death blow, the 
loser was “usually handed over to some one of the housewifes, and . . . later on served at 
the dinner table.”  In contrast, women tended to gather around the house.  Popular 
women’s activities included sewing, embroidering, making artificial flowers, and 
visiting relatives.  Dances, often sponsored by mutualistas, presented the most 
conspicuous and socially-accepted opportunities for men and women to spend leisure 
time together.89 
                                                                                                                                                
Immigration, 76; Max Sylvius Handman, “San Antonio:  The Old Capital City of Mexican Life and 
Influence,” Survey Graffic, May 1931, 164-5. 
89 Arnold, “Folk-lore, Manners, and Customs,” 14, 16, 18 (quotes); Bogardus, Mexican in the United 
States, 59; Murray, “Mexican Families,” 55. 
  
 78
Motion pictures also drew crowds on the west side, as they did throughout the 
nation.  Ten percent of Mexicans attended picture shows at least weekly, an impressive 
figure considering workers’ meager wages.  Many patronized the Majestic, the Texas, 
and the State theaters, where they watched both English and Spanish language films.  
Some theaters offered discounts for women and the elderly, and prices in hard times fell 
to two cents per ticket.  The Casa de Mexico laid claim as the most impressive cinema 
on the west side, and offered both “Spanish and Mexican films, together with a few from 
Hollywood.”  In addition to films, most theaters also treated customers to musical and 
vaudeville acts.90 
As movie theaters grew in popularity, an older and more traditionally Mexican 
form of entertainment found new influence as well.  Corrido music originated in 
northern Mexico and by the 1920s had migrated into San Antonio in the hearts, hands, 
and voices of the city’s Tejano population.  Despite the contention by one school 
superintendent that Mexicans had only marginal musical aptitude, talented performers 
graced the city’s restaurants, plazas, performance halls, and recording studios by 1930.  
Moreover, corrido had become a symbol of both ethnicity and class.  Tejanos considered 
the music an integral part of weddings, funerals, birthday celebrations, baptisms, and any 
other occasion for gathering.  The city’s five radio stations that featured corrido 
programming testified to the music’s popularity, as did the throngs of Tejanos who 
purchased radios and phonographs.  Record promoters and radio stations often 
sponsored dances that solidified corrido’s importance on the west side.  According to 
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Manuel Peña, these dances could be “driven by cultural or ideological imperatives that 
[resulted] in bold statements of identity and communal obligations and goals.”91   
Corrido lyrics may have seemed benign on the surface, but they provided deep 
historical interpretations and social discourse concerning racial relations to the Mexican 
community.  For example, in “The Immigrants” a crew of railroad workers in the U.S. 
lamented their decisions to leave home, believing that American capitalism exploited 
migrant workers.  Similarly, “The Beet Field Workers” tells of Don Santiago, who wants 
to return home from Michigan after realizing his employer had lied about the terms of 
his employment.  Other popular lyrics focused on violence between Tejanos and Texas 
Rangers along the border or other miscarriages of justice.  More than simply cementing 
its place as the music of the Mexican working class, corrido imbued its listeners with a 
pro-active, collectivist ideology.  This way of thinking about employer-employee 
relations spilled over into workplaces, such as shelleries, where laborers translated it into 
action.92 
* * * * * 
Culture-based solidarity formation undoubtedly played a large role in building 
unity inside of the workplace, but other aspects of west side life allowed the pecan 
workers to see themselves as laborers first and Mexicans second.  Solidarity formation 
                                                 
91 Arnold, “Folk-lore, Manners, and Customs,” 17; Richard A. Garcia, Rise, 81, 83; Manuel H. Peña, The 
Texas-Mexican Conjunto:  History of a Working-Class Music (Austin:  University of Texas Press, 1985), 
136, 139; Manuel Peña, Musica Tejana, 9 (first quote), 12, 77; Perry, “Cities of America,” 113; Jorge 
Reina Schement and Ricardo Flores, “The Origins of Spanish-Language Radio:  The Case of San Antonio, 
Texas,” Journalism History 4 (Summer 1977): 56-7; Daniel Sheehy, Mariachi Music in America:  
Experiencing Music, Expressing Culture (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2006), 2. 
92 Richard R. Flores, “The Corrido and the Emergence of Texas-Mexican Social Identity,” Journal of 
American Folklore 105 (Spring 1992):  169-71; Gamio, Mexican Immigration, 85-7, 104-7. 
  
 80
that rested on foundations other than shared culture fell into two general categories.  
Labor solidarity involved efforts by workers to unify in opposition to capital.  Examples 
relevant to the pecan shellers include early attempts to organize the industry, 
unionization in other industries, and participation in other organizations that promoted 
working-class interests.  Ideological solidarity formed through group identification with 
political and social agendas that did not directly rely on any association with a particular 
culture.  The women who picketed as pecan shellers in 1938 enjoyed the benefits labor 
and ideological solidarity, which complimented the cultural solidarity largely brought 
with them from Mexico. 
Efforts to unionize San Antonio’s pecan shellers prior to 1938 benefited the 
picketers who brought the industry to a standstill that year.  Attempts to organize the 
shellers before 1933 had failed, as union leaders consistently capitulated to operators in 
exchange for personal remuneration.  This corruption seemed to stop temporarily when 
Magdelano Rodríguez formed the Pecan Shelling Workers’ Union of San Antonio 
(PSWU) in 1933.  An absence of alternatives persuaded most pecan workers to join the 
union despite Rodríguez’s friendly relationship with Southern Pecan.  At its apex, 
PSWU claimed ten thousand members.  In December 1934, the shellers struck for better 
wages, prompting the National Recovery Administration (NRA) to become involved.  
The NRA sided with workers and instituted a minimum wage of 15 cents an hour, but 
workers remained unsatisfied for two reasons.  First, they knew the industry’s contract 
system could easily circumvent the minimum wage.  Second, and more importantly, 
Rodríguez angered shellers by testifying on behalf of the industry against the minimum 
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wage.  This move spurred one NRA official to characterize the union boss as a “fugitive 
from justice, a citizen of Mexico and a labor agitator who betrays his workers.”93   
The PSWU disbanded shortly thereafter, and workers established two other 
short-lived unions that proved ineffective at protecting the shellers’ interests.  The 
Mondolares de Nuez el Nogal filled the void created by the PSWU’s failure and 
persisted until 1937, although membership never topped 2,500.  The American 
Federation of Labor (AFL) chartered the Cooperative Nueceros in 1936, but high dues 
doomed that endeavor as well.  Then in 1937, Albert Gonsen established the Texas 
Pecan Shelling Workers’ Union (TPSWU).  Like the PSWU, Gonsen’s union was 
independent of national and international organizations.  This enterprise quickly faltered, 
however, when the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) arrived in San Antonio 
with aims of bringing the pecan workers under its formidable umbrella.94 
The CIO held its 1937 annual meeting in Denver, Colorado, and elected to create 
the United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing, and Allied Workers of America 
(UCAPAWA).  Agricultural workers had proved difficult to organize due to their 
migratory nature and their lack of protection under federal law.  The CIO’s leadership 
formed UCAPAWA to target the more sedentary industrial and manufacturing workers 
who processed crops for national distribution.  The union grew rapidly, boasting 76 
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locals by September 1937.  Weeks later, UCAPAWA won a critical lawsuit against 
California’s Walnut Growers Association.  The courts agreed that employees who 
processed walnuts were not agricultural workers, and thus enjoyed the benefits afforded 
workers under the Wagner Act.  This development fueled increased popularity for the 
union.  Eighteen months after its inception, UCAPAWA was the largest union in the 
CIO with more than 124,000 members in over 300 locals.95 
In November 1937 representatives from UCAPAWA granted the TPSWU a 
temporary charter as the Pecan Workers’ Union Local 172.  Although UCAPAWA was 
conceived only months earlier, many of its organizers brought a significant amount of 
experience gained while working in the same capacity for the Communist Party USA 
(CP-USA).  Contrary to the AFL, according to one historian, UCAPAWA served as a 
“model for democratic trade unionism,” particularly by encouraging female and minority 
participation in local policy formation.  Moreover, UCAPAWA gave women “the crucial 
‘social space’ necessary to assert and display their talents.”  The evidence suggests that, 
like other ethnic workers, Tejanas recognized the opportunities this new organization 
afforded them.  In explaining the way Polish and Italian immigrants viewed the CIO’s 
promise, one historian argues that “it is perhaps necessary to see it not just as a union 
movement trying to increase the wages of workers but as something of a civil crusade, a 
movement that promised a sense of dignity and empowerment to a great number of 
people previously excluded from full participation in American life.”  In this manner, the 
CIO functioned as much more than a union; indeed, it served as a rallying point for 
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unskilled, exploited ethnic laborers who wanted to create bonds with their fellow 
workers irrespective of cultural orientation.96 
Another organization that aided working-class Mexicans in San Antonio was the 
Workers Alliance (WA).  The WA emerged from the wreckage of the West Side 
Unemployment Council and acted on behalf of workers seeking coveted jobs 
administered by the Works Progress Administration (WPA).  Labor organizers Emma 
Tenayuca and Manuela Sager started the San Antonio chapter of the WA in 1934 and 
immediately became involved in workers’ issues on the west side.  At its height, as many 
as 10,000 workers sought assistance from the WA.  According to the openly-communist 
Tenayuca, the group was forced into double duty as both a union and “a social service 
organization.”  Tenayuca hoped that the WA would eventually represent all of San 
Antonio’s industrial and manufacturing workers and provide critical educational, health, 
and social programs to the poor.  Those dreams never reached fruition, however, and by 
mid-1937 local law enforcement considered the organization part of a communist 
conspiracy seeking to overthrow the city government.  Working from that assumption, 
local police raided the WA’s meeting hall in July 1937, destroying furniture, seizing 
records, and arresting Tenayuca.  Nevertheless, the allinace remained popular among 
Tejano workers.  By the end of 1937 many Mexicans were so loyal to the WA that 
UCAPAWA’s initial efforts to organize the pecan shellers struggled for lack of interest.  
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That situation reversed, however, when Tenayuca and other leaders realized the futility 
of communist-led organizing efforts in the political climate of the late 1930s.  
Accordingly, they encouraged their members to join the CIO.97 
In addition to early iterations of the shellers’ union and national labor 
organizations, Tejanas brought solidarity formed during work stoppages in other light 
manufacturing jobs with them to the pecan industry.  The west side housed dozens of 
businesses that employed Mexican women, including garment manufacturers, cigar 
factories, meat packing plants, bakeries, and other food processing facilities.  Workers in 
several shops militantly engaged their employers over wages, hours, and working 
conditions, particularly after unemployment rates began receding from the highs reached 
in 1933.  Striking cigar workers forced their employers to adopt federal regulations in 
July 1933, foreshadowing a succession of strikes that lasted several years.  The 
following year pecan shellers walked out for the first time, as did the Latin American 
bakers’ union.  In 1935 the cigar rollers struck again, this time with considerably less 
success.  Members of the city’s International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Unions 
(ILGWU) picketed several employers in 1937 and 1938 with mixed results.  The 
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cacophony of labor strife in San Antonio finally reached its crescendo in 1938 with the 
pecan shellers.98 
Few Tejanas during the 1930s worked in the same job for a long period of time, 
but they did not have to begin the process of solidarity formation anew each time they 
changed employers.  Rather, these women continued to accumulate solidarity while 
circulating from one shop to the next.  As several scholars have pointed out, “while 
workers bring different backgrounds and histories of activism to the workplace, a history 
of conflict in a particular work setting is often shared informally across different cohorts 
of workers and may provide a basis for collective action.”  Moreover, historian Richard 
A. Garcia argues that “the strikes served to crystallize the fragmentation of the Mexican 
community” along class lines, demonstrating that working-class Latinos came to identify 
themselves first and foremost as laborers.  This solidarity, forged in the fires of labor 
turmoil, gave shellers a fighting chance against pecan magnates who possessed almost 
infinitely more resources.99 
* * * * * 
While solidarity formed through labor organizations and in the workplace 
contributed to the pecan shellers’ victory in 1938, ideological solidarity played an  
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important role as well.  Elite exiles who escaped Mexico’s 1910 Revolution settled in 
San Antonio while awaiting the return of friendly conditions in their homeland.  They 
remained active promoting their ideology, establishing one of the most influential 
Spanish-language newspapers in the United States.  Similarly, socialists, communists, 
and those sympathetic to such philosophies congregated in San Antonio.  Others who 
intended to make the city their permanent home also formed organizations designed to 
improve conditions for Latinos and secure their rights as American citizens.  These 
different groups drew the support of many workers on the west side who yearned for 
more social and political advocacy.  These issues and ideologies formed another avenue 
of solidarity formation down which working-class Mexicans traveled in the 1920s and 
1930s. 
As Mexico’s 1910 Revolution raged, elites loyal to President Porfirio Díaz 
sought refuge in the United States.  Rather than passively waiting for peace in Mexico 
those exiles worked on gaining converts to their political ideology.  The most visible 
example of their proselytizing was the daily newspaper, La Prensa.  Ignacio E. Lozano 
founded the publication in 1913 after fleeing Mexico five years earlier.  From the outset, 
several respected Mexican expatriates and intellectuals wrote for the paper.  Whereas 
corridos and other oral traditions purveyed Mexican culture to the masses, La Prensa 
created a written record of the events and issues affecting Latinos in the U.S.  Most of 
these individuals, like Lozano, were conservative political refugees.  Unlike those who 
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founded LULAC, La Prensa’s architects wanted to preserve Mexican culture in the 
U.S.100 
Initially the newspaper focused on events in Mexico, often to the exclusion of 
local news.  As exiles resigned themselves to a longer stay in San Antonio than 
originally expected, they took greater interest in Latinos living north of the Rio Grande.  
La Prensa reached a wide audience, circulating across South Texas and in major cities 
throughout the southwestern U.S. and northern Mexico.  Although the newspaper started 
as a vehicle for elite intellectuals, its viewpoint quickly spread to the masses.  One 
contemporary scholar examining the publication’s role in San Antonio’s Mexican 
community noted that even the poor and unemployed gathered in Milam Park, where 
some read the newspaper aloud to others and then followed with discussion.  Over time, 
La Prensa became a uniting force within the community and was one of the few 
institutions that consistently and unwaveringly supported San Antonio’s struggling 
working class.  Sociologist and Mexican national Manuel Gamio considered La Prensa 
one of the few quality Spanish-language newspapers in the U.S. on the basis that it 
promoted Mexican culture and activities, defended Latinos against all forms of 
discrimination, and provided a concrete link to Mexico.101 
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Many of the intellectuals featured in La Prensa were either socialists or 
advocated socialist policies.  Racism within the Socialist Party of Texas precluded 
Mexican participation, so Tejanos formed their own groups.  In September 1905, a 
Federal Labor Union (FLU) local formed in Loredo.  This umbrella organization used 
the local Spanish-language newspaper to prepare for class warfare, which it believed 
would incidentally occur along racial lines.  In 1911, El Primer Congreso Mexicanista 
met for a week of speeches, presentations, and workshops, as well as poetry readings and 
musical performances.  According to one scholar, the meeting promoted unity through 
nationalism, but also on the basis of “a radical working class ideology.”  By the 1930s 
Tejanos had established a tradition of socialism that incorporated cultural and ethnic 
unity.102 
The labor leadership that developed on the west side in the 1930s lured followers 
by highlighting the tradition of socialist, working-class ideology that existed on both 
sides of the Mexico-U.S. border for decades prior to the Depression.  The CP-USA 
attracted many qualified Mexican leaders because the organization had resources and an 
ideology that appealed to minority groups.  Moreover, communists routinely worked to 
end discrimination and police violence against Tejanos.  The pecan workers followed a 
variety of leaders who espoused socialist arguments, the most prominent being Emma 
Tenayuca.  An avowed communist and wife of CP-USA gubernatorial candidate Homer 
Brooks, Tenayuca worked diligently on behalf of the west side’s working class.  She 
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directed her efforts at organizing labor rather than recruiting communists, but the 
socialist literature she read and the meetings she attended influenced her worldview.  
The CP-USA struggled to organize workers, however, possibly because they refused to 
evoke Mexican history, culture, and heritage that would have attracted Tejanos.  The 
Party halted organizing efforts when most of its labor leadership left to join the CIO in 
1935, but its philosophy continued to influence working-class ideology on the west side 
until the beginning of World War II.103 
Other groups designed to promote the interests of working Tejanos also appeared 
in San Antonio prior to the Depression.  One that enjoyed some longevity was the Pan 
American Round Table of San Antonio (PART).  Florence T. Griswold founded the 
organization in October 1916 to aid refugees, regardless of class, escaping Mexico.  The 
Round Table strove to reshape identities by promoting a vision of hemispheric unity that 
specifically excluded Europe.  The organization adopted a decidedly anti-socialist stance 
and encouraged “recognition of the indisputable truth that as other nations and peoples 
look first after their own, so the people of the Americas should think first of the 
preservation of the heritage that has come down to them through the labors and 
sacrifices of Washington, Lincoln, Juarez, Simon Bolivar, and San Martin.”  This 
message, which implicitly denounced discrimination against Mexicans, found a 
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receptive audience on the west side, where workers fought for fair treatment from their 
employers.104 
* * * * * 
One scholar has suggested that “in developing solidarity and organizing 
spontaneity among the poor and the powerless,” organizers “must directly link the goals 
and activities of the movement to the cultural, tangible symbols of solidarity and 
empowerment commonly accepted among the members.”  By 1938, Tejanas on the west 
side had developed a sense of togetherness through a wide range of organizations and 
activities.  This unity, although substantial, would not have resulted in victory for the 
pecan shellers by itself.  Even coupled with grossly substandard living conditions on the 
west side, the solidarity that Mexicans forged through the years would have been wasted 
if not for a favorable political climate.  The Depression prompted many Americans to 
reconsider the proper relationships between capital, labor, and the government.  Like 
many workers in other places and industries, San Antonio’s Mexican population took 
advantage of changing attitudes by challenging the city’s pecan operators. 
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CHAPTER V 
OPPORTUNITY 
 The absence of a successful pecan shellers’ strike prior to 1938 suggests that the 
combination of poverty and solidarity do not fully explain the workers’ victory.  To 
understand why the work stoppage occurred at the beginning of 1938 and why labor 
prevailed, it is necessary to examine the political environment in San Antonio at the 
time.  At the federal level, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal included 
legislation that afforded American workers previously unknown freedoms in organizing 
and collective bargaining.  In Texas, James V. Allred earned a reputation for fighting big 
business as the state’s attorney general, and he used it to court labor during his two 
victorious gubernatorial campaigns.  San Antonio’s political machine had dominated 
municipal elections for decades, but even there outsiders made inroads by 1939.  Poll 
taxes prevented most Tejanos from voting, although several organizations fought to end 
that method of disfranchisement.  Election results from the period, therefore, offer clues 
about Anglos’ evolving thoughts on labor and race issues.  In this atmosphere of political 
and social upheaval, San Antonio’s pecan shellers found an opportunity to challenge 
their employers.105 
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* * * * * 
The Great Depression remains the greatest economic catastrophe in U.S. history, 
and its impact on American government was immense.  Millions lost their jobs between 
1929 and 1933 as banks and crops failed.  The stock market struggled to regain 
investors’ trust after the great crash in October 1929, and debate raged over the merits 
and drawbacks of gold-backed American dollars.  Texans regretted making President 
Herbert Hoover the first Republican to carry the state in 1928, but few had direct outlets 
for their frustration until November 1932.  That year, Hoover’s administration became 
another casualty of the Depression.106 
 In the presidential election of 1932, Hoover faced New York Governor Franklin 
Roosevelt.  The two candidates offered the public a sharp philosophical contrast.  
Hoover believed that the U.S. could not afford government spending so long as the 
Depression restricted federal income generated by taxes.  Moreover, he thought 
American citizens should take care of themselves and their neighbors, as their pioneering 
forefathers had done, without depending on federal assistance.  As for labor, Hoover 
wanted to maintain the status quo.  He applauded employees and employers for agreeing 
to static wage levels and minimizing conflict while waiting for the economic downturn 
to end.  Conversely, Roosevelt promised a more active executive branch.  He told an 
audience in Boston days before the election that “the American working-man, the mill-
worker of New England, the miner of the west, the railroad worker, the farmer, and the 
white collar man” should vote against the business friendly Republican Party and for his 
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plan to save the economy with an infusion of federal spending.  Furthermore, he wooed 
laborers with the observation that they were overdue for “a reduction of the hours of 
work and the number of working days per week,” and argued that only the federal 
government could ensure employers would adhere to such regulations.  Of particular 
interest to shellers in San Antonio, Roosevelt declared that while he favored restricted 
immigration to protect American wages and employment, he also recognized that “in the 
enforcement of the immigration laws serious abuses have been revealed.”  Americans 
voiced their support of Roosevelt, or rejection of Hoover, by electing him president by 
substantial majorities across the nation.  San Antonians joined in the landslide by casting 
twice as many votes for FDR than for Hoover.107 
 At least one historian has charged that Roosevelt did little to aid Mexican 
workers or protect their unions, but evidence suggests that the president had concern for 
residents, including pecan workers, on the west side.  Father Carmelo Tranchese of Our 
Lady of Guadalupe Parish cultivated a relationship with FDR during his first term in 
office through San Antonio’s U.S. Representative.  Tranchese worked tirelessly to 
secure better housing and jobs for his flock, and implored Roosevelt to address living 
conditions in the barrio.  The two regularly corresponded with one another, and, in the 
early 1940s, Tranchese eventually secured federal funding for low-rent housing in San 
Antonio that replaced many corrales.  Beyond the president, other members of the 
executive branch expressed support for pecan shellers and other Mexican workers, both 
directly and indirectly.  J. Warren Madden, chairman of the National Labor Relations 
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Board, testified before the U.S. Senate that “the right of workmen to organize 
themselves into unions has become an important civil liberty. . . . It would seem that if 
an American Government, State or Federal, were to enact a statute forbidding workmen 
from organizing unions, that statute would be declared unconstitutional as a deprivation 
of liberty or property.”  Secretary of Labor Francis Perkins focused more specifically on 
the plight of pecan workers.  Upon learning how little shellers earned for each pound of 
nuts they picked clean, she pointedly asked the city’s operators, “do you in San Antonio 
call that wages?”108 
 Entering the 1936 election season, President Roosevelt faced Republican Alfred 
Landon, governor of Kansas.  Landon’s attack on FDR picked up where Hoover’s left 
off four years earlier.  The governor accused the president of usurping power from 
Congress to orchestrate a massive spending campaign that put the nation in considerable 
debt without curbing unemployment.  In addition, Landon charged, Roosevelt violated 
the principles of federalism by funneling authority away from local governments toward 
the White House.  The Republican candidate then offered voters a choice by promising 
to dismantle the bureaucratic behemoth created under the New Deal and to close the 
Social Security Administration before it deducted any money from their paychecks.  
Although Landon referred to his blue-collar background in portraying himself as the 
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labor candidate, his message focused on peaceful resolutions to labor strife and the 
importance of unions remaining politically independent of any party.  At the same time, 
Roosevelt padded his own credentials by forging a personal relationship with long-time 
labor leader John L. Lewis.  In a speech the week before election day, the president also 
resolved to “improve working conditions for the workers of America – to reduce hours 
over-long, to increase wages that spell starvation, to end the labor of children, to wipe 
out sweatshops.”  These issues formed the core of shellers’ problems, and they likely 
took note of Roosevelt’s position.109   
Since passage of the Wagner Act, which codified workers’ rights to organize and 
bargain collectively, secured FDR most of the labor vote, he reached out to other 
previously neglected groups just prior to the election.  The president told a crowd 
assembled at Howard University that “among American citizens there should be no 
forgotten men and no forgotten races.”  Two days later, Roosevelt commented on 
immigration in terms relevant to Tejanos on the west side.  “I am inclined to think,” the 
president stated, “that in some cases the newer citizens have discharged their obligations 
to us better than we have discharged our obligations to them. . . . we have, for too long, 
neglected the housing problem for all our lower-income groups. . . . But we have not yet 
begun adequately to spend money in order to help the families in the over-crowded 
sections to live as American citizens should have the right to live.”  Roosevelt’s ideas 
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resonated with a majority of Texans, as well as most other Americans.  A tally of votes 
in San Antonio revealed that FDR outpaced Landon there by a three to one margin.110 
 San Antonians expressed their attitudes about increased federal involvement in 
their lives by aiding Roosevelt’s election efforts, but also by sending a U.S. 
Representative to Washington, D. C., whose agenda matched that of the chief executive.  
Maury Maverick came from a ranching family that was among the best-known in the 
San Antonio area.  The Mavericks arrived in Texas before the state won independence 
from Mexico, and the family contributed men to both that effort and the Civil War.  
Maverick had served in the Army during World War I, where he saw combat and earned 
a purple heart.  Neither his family’s reputation nor his service to his country spared him 
from the brutal honesty observers employed when describing his physical appearance, 
however.  “Rotund, small, and olive-skinned,” wrote one observer, “with massive 
shoulders and a big head growing out of them.  Maury looks rather like a bullfrog sitting 
on a damp rock.”  Another described Maverick as a “squat, broad-framed, bench-legged 
man about forty years old with the general appearance of a bulldog.”  As for 
temperament, many agreed with the characterization that Maverick was “brusque, 
aggressive; some say bull-headed and add something about a china shop.”  After serving 
as the Bexar County Tax Collector and organizing charitable events for underprivileged 
children during the early 1930s, Maverick elected to run for U.S. Congress.111 
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 Texas, like all southern states, was dominated by the Democratic Party in the 
1930s, hence, the Democratic primaries held each summer during election years 
invariably determined who would win the general election the following November.  In 
July 1934, Maverick faced Charles K. Quin for the Democratic nomination to the state’s 
newly created 20th Congressional District.  Quin had been elected mayor of San Antonio 
in 1933 with backing from the city’s political machine.  The mayor attacked Maverick in 
the press, claiming the former was a communist, as evidenced by his membership in the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).  Maverick launched a counter-offensive 
against Quin, accusing him of fear mongering, and asked his fellow veterans to put him 
in office.  The first primary in July failed to produce a simple majority for either man, 
but Maverick won the runoff election weeks later, capturing 54 percent of the vote.  The 
newly-elected congressman then left for Washington promising to represent all San 
Antonians, including Tejanos, and fight for working Americans.112 
 President Roosevelt could always count on Maverick’s vote concerning New 
Deal legislation, but the representative’s deepest passions centered on civil liberties.  
Historian Charles Beard praised Maverick for insisting that the legislative branch, the 
most responsive to public opinion, maintain the war-making authority stipulated in the 
U.S. Constitution.  In addition, Roger Baldwin, director of the ACLU for more than 
three decades, lauded Maverick for standing “at the center of all efforts for the civil 
liberties legislation.”  Baldwin continued that “among the handful of civil rights 
champions in Congress over the years, Maury stands out as the most devoted.”  Anti-
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lynching legislation provides one example of Maverick’s values.  As a freshman 
representative he drew attention for supporting such legislation, and, by one 
contemporary account, was the only congressman from a southern state to take a stand 
against the racially-charged form of violence.  When questioned about his motivations 
for outlawing the vigilantism, he replied, “I want the law passed because I don’t want 
Negroes to get lynched.”  Maverick’s greatest crusade, however, was the protection of 
free speech.  He believed all Americans had the right to voice their opinions, regardless 
of popularity.  The congressman often found himself in the unenviable position of 
defending communistic speech, which allowed political adversaries and other critics to 
portray him as a sympathizer.  Ultimately, that dedication to the cause of free speech 
proved to be Maverick’s political undoing.113 
 Maverick lent more ammunition to his anti-communist adversaries with his pro-
labor rhetoric.  In one speech given while he was tax collector, he argued that “human 
rights shall always be superior to property rights. . . . To be specific, this rule of 
humanity places all machines, all factories, all property, secondary and subordinate to 
the people and not at the whim of a few selfish ones who by their selfish and unregulated 
profit system, bring misery to millions.” Maverick also railed against monopolies, 
particularly in utilities, and wanted the government to “go on a trust-busting expedition 
like Theodore Roosevelt did, only about ten times as strong.”  The representative 
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championed a minimum wage as well, and was one of only three Texas congressmen to 
support the National Labor Relations Act.114 
Maverick also believed that constitutional amendment offered the best avenue for 
working Americans to protect their rights as laborers.  He argued that members of the 
ruling class had convinced most voters that the Constitution was a sacred document, 
while simultaneously using it to protect their fortunes.  Any meaningful change, he 
advocated, would require an overhaul of the government’s founding charter.  In the 
meantime, the congressman believed that unions provided workers the most protection 
against abuses.  “I am for any labor organization which dominates a particular field and 
serves justly the members of that particular craft or industry,” Maverick stated in 1937.  
“For that reason,” he continued, “I approve of all labor organizations, and when I say all, 
I mean ALL of them; and that means the American Federation of Labor . . . the 
Committee for Industrial Organization, and the Rail Brotherhoods.  If there are any more 
I am in favor of them, too.”  Thus, San Antonio’s shellers had ample reason to believe 
that their congressman would support efforts to organize and bargain with pecan 
operators.115 
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Maverick addressed labor issues in a manner that Mexican workers, including 
pecan shellers, likely found appealing, but he also reached out to San Antonio’s Tejano 
community in other ways.  As the county tax collector, he questioned the mayor’s 
decision to extend services, such as garbage collection, to homes that laid outside of the 
city limits, particularly when west side residents lacked those same services.  He 
speculated that race and class drove city hall’s actions in the matter, and promised the 
Mexican community that they would receive better treatment while he was in office.  
The congressman also worked to provide legal assistance to jailed Tejanos, including 
Emma Tenayuca.  The relationship Maverick developed with Mexicans in San Antonio 
partly explains his political success.  He consistently won large majorities on the west 
side that helped him overcome the city’s political machine, but, more importantly, he 
convinced Anglos that they should care about the barrio as well.  His message of 
cleaning the city’s image by fixing problems on the west side resonated with voters over 
several election cycles, suggesting that a wide range of San Antonians bought into his 
pro-labor and pro-Mexican stances.  Anglo willingness to support the New Deal and its 
disciples provided pecan workers their first glimpse of opportunity to challenge area 
businesses.  To force meaningful change, however, they had to both wait for and 
recognize deeper fissures in the extant political landscape at the state and municipal 
levels.116 
* * * * * 
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 Although residents of San Antonio offered insights into their thinking about 
labor, poverty, and immigration through their voting in federal elections, results of state 
and local contests filter out much of the pro-Democratic sentiment that skewed national 
election outcomes in the region.  A legacy of the Civil War and Reconstruction, Texans 
had consistently voted for Democrats in national elections for more than half a century 
by the 1930s.  The party also dominated in state elections, and politicians across Texas 
with aspirations of winning office typically ran as Democrats.  Although the governor of 
Texas wielded less power than in many other states, the chief executive’s office retained 
symbolic significance and offered an unparalleled pulpit from which to influence the 
legislative agenda.  The results in the Democratic primary elections for governor indicate 
that San Antonians welcomed expanded rights for both labor and Tejanos, giving 
shellers further reason for optimism. 
 The two leading candidates for the Democratic nomination for governor in 1932 
were incumbent Ross Sterling and former governor Miriam “Ma” Ferguson.  Although 
each had a track record as governor upon which to run, both opted instead to expend 
their energies attacking the other.  Ferguson charged Sterling with mishandling the 
chaotic oil boom in eastern Texas that resulted in the governor declaring martial law in 
several counties, a move eventually deemed unconstitutional by the state’s Supreme 
Court.  In addition, she emphasized Sterling’s personal wealth, estimated at $50 million, 
and ties to big business.  Sterling countered that his opponent’s husband, James “Pa” 
Ferguson, actually masterminded her campaign, and that Miriam was merely his puppet.  
This was problematic, Sterling insisted, because “Pa” had been impeached during his 
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second term as governor and banned from holding state office.  The two camps traded 
barbs while running on similar platforms of fiscal responsibility highlighted by small 
government and low taxes.  “Ma” Ferguson garnered more votes than Sterling in the July 
primary, but her lack of a fifty percent majority set the stage for an August runoff 
election.  Sterling used the extra time to court labor in Houston, women in Waco, and 
Mexicans on the west side.  His efforts proved futile, however, as Ferguson defeated the 
incumbent in both Texas and in San Antonio.117 
 Another Democratic hopeful, James V. Allred, ran for reelection to the state 
attorney general’s office in 1932.  He faced no serious challenges from other candidates 
that summer, but the state’s burgeoning oil industry inundated voters with anti-Allred 
propaganda.  During his first term, the attorney general had worked to prevent 
monopolization of the state’s oil deposits, and he promised more of the same for his 
second term.  Allred won reelection easily, and two years later set his sights on the 
state’s highest office.  He ran for governor in 1934 against a bevy of contenders, most 
notably Tom F. Hunter.  Allred told voters they could expect less corporate influence in 
the statehouse with him in office, and made one controversial decision that intimately 
affected the Mexican community.  The state congress passed a white primary law, which 
barred African Americans from voting in primary elections, in 1923, but the statute’s 
applicability to Tejanos remained unsettled going into the summer of 1934.  Acting as 
attorney general and just days before the election, Allred declared that “the common 
usage of the term ‘white person’ as it is generally understood by the people of this State 
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includes those persons who are commonly designated as ‘Mexicans.’”  Whether this 
decision resulted in a net gain or net loss of votes for Allred remains undetermined, but 
the symbolism likely resonated with shellers.  The attorney general finished as the top 
vote getter in the July primary, although by an insufficient margin to avoid a runoff.  The 
following month, Allred defeated Hunter by more than forty thousand votes to become 
the 34th Governor of Texas.118 
 Allred entered office free from the scandals that plagued the Fergusons during 
their terms in office and without the ties to business that cast suspicion on Ross Sterling.  
To the contrary, according to one biographer, Allred had “a sympathetic understanding 
of the every-day life of the humble family, and a zeal to lend a helping hand to those 
who have to fight along the way of life.”  During his first term, the governor developed a 
friendly relationship with President Roosevelt and worked to implement public works 
projects, a state equivalent to social security, an employment agency within the Texas 
Department of Labor, and procure additional funds for education.  To pay for these 
measures, the governor shifted the tax burden from individual property holders to 
companies that extracted the state’s natural resources, particularly oil.  By the summer of 
1936, Allred’s accomplishments earned him the support of labor, and he made efforts to 
reach to Mexican community, as well.  In the first speech of his reelection campaign in 
Waxahachie, the governor expressed his “fond hope and fervent wish that every citizen 
will, in the language of the President, continue to be a ‘good neighbor,’” a clear 
reference to Roosevelt’s attempt at respectful foreign policy toward Latin America.  
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With broad support, Allred won the Democratic primary in July, and secured his second 
term in office the following November.119 
 The governor’s posture toward labor was tested early during his second stint in 
office.  The newest weapon in labor’s arsenal against capital, the sit-down strike, 
alarmed many Texans.  In April 1937, Allred publicly denounced sit-down strikes as a 
violation of property rights, and promised to use the law enforcement personnel under 
his charge to stop any such action.  Many viewed this as a new stance for the governor, 
who had openly courted union members in each of his gubernatorial campaigns.  The 
misgivings of labor proved unfounded only months later.  In August 1937, several 
Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO) recruiters suspected of promoting 
communism were beaten and kidnapped by mobs in Dallas over the course of several 
days.  When municipal authorities reacted slowly to the situation, Allred sent the Texas 
Rangers to restore order.  Many workers lauded the governor’s decision, although he 
insisted that support of free speech, rather than the CIO, guided his actions.  Residents of 
Dallas similarly thanked the chief executive, with the Dallas County Law Enforcement 
League formally commending Allred “for his timely and decisive action in sending in 
the Texas Rangers to Dallas, to protect the persons and lives of our local people from a 
condition of violence bordering on anarchy.”  Physical intimidation and violence at the 
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hands of local law enforcement often dissuaded workers from striking in cities such as 
San Antonio.  Governor Allred sent a clear message in the late summer of 1937, 
however, that he would not tolerate the use of force against law-abiding citizens.  This 
message found an audience on the west side, where pecan shellers had reason to believe 
the state would come to their aid if the local police acted against them.120 
* * * * * 
 While the voting patterns of San Antonians at the state and federal levels indicate 
openness to change, municipal election returns paint an even more vivid picture of the 
city’s shifting mood.  Party affiliations mattered little at the local level, where the 
political machine ran candidates on the People’s Ticket.  To win public office in San 
Antonio meant joining the machine or overcoming the manifold problems outsiders 
faced when challenging the establishment.  Unlike more famous machines in Jersey City 
and Kansas City, the People’s Ticket had no single boss, but rather a “composite 
bossism made up of the city’s commissioners.”  Machine politics in San Antonio 
functioned much as they did elsewhere, however, with patronage exchanged for votes.  
The mayor had 1,800 jobs to offer compliant and loyal underlings, and could influence 
close elections by issuing poll-tax receipts to voters who had not actually paid for their  
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right to cast a ballot.  Most who received municipal jobs from the mayor worked in 
departments that afforded opportunities to supplement their incomes with graft.  The 
city’s Health Department, according to one observer, was “an agency through which 
collectors shake down that poor, miserable class of females who make their livings as 
members of the world’s oldest profession.”  Other illegal ventures, such as gambling 
halls and unlicensed saloons, could also persuade officials to overlook their indiscretions 
with bribes.  The San Antonio Police Department, which was “regarded with mild 
contempt by a large contingent of the populace” according to one resident, acted as the 
machine’s enforcement arm, intimidating those who sought to challenge the existing 
order.  When patronage and threats failed, the People’s Ticket resorted to its most 
insidious tactic to win elections.  The machine convinced San Antonians that 
communists sought to destroy their way of life, then red-baited the opposition.121 
 The city’s Mexican voters, few as they were, felt the machine’s full force.  One 
San Antonian testified before the U.S. House of Representatives in 1930 that Tejanos, 
“dependent on their jobs as city or county employees . . . follow the commands of bosses 
at elections.  They are so closely watched that they cannot do otherwise.”  Even when 
those bosses paid poll taxes for Mexican voters, the barrio remained underrepresented.  
Of the estimated 100,000 Tejanos living in San Antonio in 1939, for example, only 
9,374 paid the tax required to vote.  Shellers and other west side residents who chose to  
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take action formed the Association of Independent Voters.  The Association articulated 
seven demands and aims in 1932, which included supporting candidates who 
demonstrated willingness to work with Latin Americans, working to secure Mexican 
participation on juries, increasing the number of eligible voters, and educating Tejanos 
on participation in a representative democracy.  Yet, throughout most of the 1930s 
Mexicans in San Antonio either declined to vote or were legally and economically 
disfranchised.122 
 The stranglehold that the People’s Ticket placed on city politics in the 1930s 
ended abruptly at the end of the decade.  Election outcomes, moreover, suggest that San 
Antonians abandoned the machine just after pecan shellers gained critical support from 
the CIO.  In the 1933 city elections, however, the machine fired on all cylinders.  Sitting 
mayor Charles K. Quin had entered the office only months before the May contest as an 
interim replacement for his longtime friend, C. M. Chambers, who died before his term 
expired.  Quin, running for the People’s Ticket, garnered 9,580 more votes than his three 
opponents combined.  The election’s outcome was so predictable that the city’s leading 
newspaper, the Express, chose not to cover the race in preceding weeks.  Two years later 
Quin ran unopposed, but he managed to accumulate even more votes than he had in 
1933.  The mayor faced some competition in 1937, although he safely outdistanced 
runner-up George R. Thompson by a margin of nearly four to one.  The People’s Ticket 
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so thoroughly dominated the election that Quin won a majority in each of the city’s 197 
voting precincts.  The results prompted Frank Bushick, who won reelection as Tax 
Commissioner, to insist that “they can’t talk about the machine any more because 
everyone in the city seems to belong to it.”  The People’s Ticket had once again 
dominated city elections, but Quin, Bushick, and their cronies failed to recognize the tide 
of public opinion rising against them.123 
 Midway through Quin’s third full term in office, San Antonians voted in the 
Democratic primary for the U.S. House seat held by Maury Maverick.  In that contest, 
the incumbent faced People’s Ticket candidate Paul Kilday, brother of the city’s police 
chief.  In the weeks leading up to the July, 1938, election, Maverick endured a barrage of 
red-baiting from the machine.  When the congressman reminded the Mexican 
community that he worked to free jailed Tejano leaders, Kilday quickly suggested that 
those leaders, including Emma Tenayuca, were communists intent on overtaking city 
hall.  The challenger then went after Maverick’s voting record in the U.S. House, 
claiming that the incumbent opposed expanding the navy because he wanted to make 
America more vulnerable to foreign attack.  Kilday’s cleverest tactic, however, targeted 
Maverick’s staunchly pro-labor orientation.  “No one was surprised,” Kilday claimed, 
“when he got on the bandwagon of the CIO because it was the most radical organization 
in the country.”  At the same time, Kilday appealed to workers with his own 
endorsement from American Federation of Labor president William Green. The two 
candidates battled, Maverick as a man of the people and friend of Tejanos and Kilday as 
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defender of capitalism and liberty, until election eve.  When the last vote was counted, 
Kilday began packing his bags for Washington, and Maverick suffered his first loss in 
five elections.124 
 The former representative recovered quickly and decided to again challenge San 
Antonio’s political machine by running for mayor in 1939.  Maverick promised 
meaningful change on the west side, a theme he developed while in congress.  For years 
he had called for “at least ordinary, low-cost, sanitary and healthy housing for every 
single citizen.”  He implored his fellow San Antonians to place high priority on 
“improving living conditions, assisting in employment, and raising the general standard 
of the people in our city.”  Maverick collected endorsements from several prominent 
Tejanos, including Tenayuca, and the pecan shellers undoubtedly remembered the moral 
support he lent them during their strike.  As always, the aspiring mayor kept an office on 
the west side, and his commitment to the barrio eventually forced Mayor Quin to 
campaign in the neighborhood as well.  One of Quin’s west side rallies included 
Mexican music, and he promised the crowd that, if reelected, he would work to get a 
public swimming pool constructed for the community.  Despite the incumbent’s charges 
that Maverick’s disparaging public remarks accounted for the west side’s dismal 
reputation, the city’s Mexicans again supported the challenger.  The former 
congressman, who had lost his seat less than a year earlier to the machine, avenged 
himself in May 1939 as he was elected Mayor of San Antonio.125 
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* * * * * 
Maverick’s victory over Quin punctuated a massive shift in public opinion in San 
Antonio.  In 1928, the city had helped elect Herbert Hoover, the first Republican to carry 
Texas since Reconstruction.  Just over a decade later, San Antonians elected Maverick, 
an unabashed New Dealer widely considered more liberal than even FDR, as their 
mayor.  The Great Depression led to political turmoil that opened doors for politicians, 
such as Roosevelt, Allred, and Maverick, who advocated more and stronger support for 
both labor and Tejanos.  Yet, poll taxes restricted the flow of Mexicans to the ballot box.  
The electoral success of men who wanted to change the status quo, therefore, rested 
largely on the shoulders of Anglos.  That such reform-minded individuals won office 
testifies to the desire Anglos had to see workers, particularly those exploited to the 
degree of the pecan shellers, acquire more leverage against their employers.  By the 
beginning of 1938, the shellers had ample reason to want change in both their home and 
working lives, and they had developed the solidarity required to mount a sustained attack 
against pecan operators.  Moreover, the new political environment signaled that public 
sympathy to their plight had reached an all-time high.  From their contemporary vantage 
point, Mexican leaders may not have completely understood how well the table was set 
for a successful strike, but one fact remains certain.  The operators’ decision to cut 
shellers’ pay by a single cent on January 31, 1938, provoked a motivated, organized, and 
opportunistic union into waging the longest strike in San Antonio’s history. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE STRIKE 
 On Thursday, January 27, thousands of workers congregated in the west side’s 
Casiano Park to hear James Sager speak.  Sager, head of the United Cannery, 
Agricultural, Packing, and Allied Workers of America (UCAPAWA) in Texas, urged 
pecan workers to strike if operators refused to restore six-cent (for pieces) and seven-
cent (for whole kernels) wages.  Shellers had endured pay cuts in the past without 
striking, but by the beginning of 1938 a walkout seemed to hold more promise than in 
earlier years.  Sager’s efforts paid off, as droves of workers walked out of pecan plants 
across the west side on January 31.  Approximately two-thirds of the city’s twelve 
thousand pecan workers partook in the strike’s first day.  The shellers peacefully 
protested their pay cut, and the only arrests involved individuals who did not work in the 
pecan industry.126 
Most prominent among those arrested was Emma Tenayuca.  Labeled an agitator 
by the business leaders and local politicians who constituted San Antonio’s 
establishment, Tenayuca offered pecan workers her considerable talents and dynamic 
personality.  Despite being a twenty-year-old woman in a male-dominated society, she 
earned the respect of Mexican workers across the city with her efforts on behalf of 
impoverished laborers.  Tenayuca sympathized with the pecan shellers, and more than 
three hundred workers repaid her efforts by protesting outside the police station where 
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she was held.  San Antonio’s police released her on February 1, and the pecan workers 
rewarded her sacrifice by electing her the strike’s honorary chair person.127 
Tenayunca’s role as lightning rod had just begun, however.  Her political 
leanings were well known throughout San Antonio, and the city’s establishment quickly 
linked Tenayuca’s ideology with the strike.  Knowing the public took a dim view of 
communism, Mayor Charles Quin and Police Chief Owen Kilday portrayed the strike as 
a red plot to infiltrate the west side and, eventually, the city government.  By her own 
admission Tenayuca knew little of Marxist doctrine, but it contained labor-friendly 
notions that appealed to her as well as other Tejanos who perceived societal inequities in 
the U.S.  After just one week Tenayuca recognized that her reputation could ultimately 
undermine the strike, so she relinquished her leadership role.  Nevertheless, she 
continued to work on behalf of pecan shellers by attracting national media attention to 
their fight.  Most notably, she garnered attention from Time magazine in a late February 
issue that described her as “a slim, vivacious labor organizer with black eyes and a Red 
philosophy.”128 
The city government wasted no time in showing its support for the pecan 
operators, and on February 2 Police Chief Kilday denied that the strike existed.  His 
officers disbursed several small bands of protesters whom Kilday claimed violated the 
law by blocking sidewalks and impeding the flow of traffic.  Moreover, he contended  
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that communists had illegally organized and instigated the workers.  Mayor Quin further 
discouraged pecan workers from striking the following day.  In surprise visits to two 
shelling plants, Quin told workers that “I am convinced that you will not be able to 
receive a fair and calm and dispassionate hearing if you permit Communistic Leaders to 
excite and agitate your people.”  Perhaps this message would have been more effective if 
shellers had been allowed to stop working while the mayor spoke, but, in any event, 
James Sager proved more persuasive.  He told more than one thousand workers 
assembled at the union hall the evening of February 2 that he would “send a delegation 
of workers to Governor James Allred so they can explain conditions in the city, the 
causes of the workers’ movement, police intervention.”  He went on to state that the 
pecan workers walked out of their own accord, not as the result of the communist 
influences alleged by Kilday and Quin.129 
The city’s elected officials predictably denounced the strike, but charges of 
communism subverted support from quarters where the workers should have expected 
the most help.  More than ninety percent of the pecan workers were Catholic, yet the 
Church opted to oppose the strike.  Father Juan Lopez of the National Catholic Welfare 
Council arrived in San Antonio several weeks prior to the strike, and he acted as a 
spokesman for the shellers during the conflict’s opening days.  Lopez believed that there 
were “communists in the CIO . . . and it is our job to get them out.”  When the Congress 
of Industrial Organizations (CIO) assumed control of the walkout just days later, Lopez 
took the popular position of supporting the workers but opposing the strike.  Although 
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Lopez considered conditions among pecan shellers “the most disgraceful among 
Mexicans in the United States,” he promoted local leadership and a direct charter for 
pecan workers with the CIO, rather than membership under UCAPAWA.  Lopez 
combated allegations that the Church failed the picketers by pointing out that 
Catholicism had been there for Mexicans since the time of the conquistadors, when friars 
gave the indigenous people not only religion and God, but also civilization.  Similarly, 
Arthur J. Drossaerts, archbishop of San Antonio, told one crowd that “the conscientious 
citizens of this city deplore the terrible living conditions in which many people on the 
city’s West Side reside,” but that the public must support the police department’s fight 
“to exterminate the most dangerous of all doctrines: atheist Communism.”130   
Like the Catholic Church, many local organizations chose not to support the 
picketers due to perceived communist influences.  The Mexican Chamber of Commerce 
and the League of Loyal Latin Americans issued a joint statement explaining that they 
were “deeply interested in seeing that every worker of Mexican descent receives a living 
wage,” but that they also wanted “to make absolutely certain that in throwing our moral 
support behind the present pecan shellers’ strike we are not furthering communism.”  
More surprisingly, the pecan shellers failed to gain the support of International Ladies 
Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) locals in San Antonio.  One representative of that 
union, Maxwell Burkett, initially denied that the CIO sanctioned the shellers’ strike.  
Rebecca Taylor, ILGWU manager in San Antonio, expressed that the garment workers 
sympathized with the pecan workers, but that they refused to join the picket lines due to 
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the communist leadership provided by Tenayuca and UCAPAWA.  The Mexican 
Commercial Grocery Workers Union of San Antonio assumed a similar stance, and the 
shellers found themselves virtually without institutional support in San Antonio 
throughout the entire strike.131 
The CIO, unwilling to let Tenayuca’s vulnerability to red-baiting derail the 
strike, hastily moved in and took control.  On the strike’s fifth day, UCAPAWA 
president Donald Henderson arrived in San Antonio, and he established official demands 
on behalf of the workers on February 6.  The four demands he outlined before two 
thousand picketers congregated in Casiano Park included a wage hike to seven and eight 
cents a pound for shelled pecans, sheller participation in all weightings, recognition of 
the union as the workers’ sole bargaining agent, and additional compensation to offset 
the expense of mandatory health cards.  Henderson brought considerably more resources 
and experience to the strike than did Tenayuca or any other local leader.  That external 
support lent vital confidence to the shellers and fundamentally altered the conflict’s 
dimensions.  To counter this new threat, Chief Kilday stepped up efforts to discourage 
picketers from participating in the walkout.132 
Beginning on February 7, Kilday’s police force intimidated, harassed, beat, and 
arrested thousands of Mexicans on the west side.  On the strike’s eighth day, the San 
Antonio police attacked a group of three hundred who had gathered in front of a pecan 
plant in protest.  Most of the crowd escaped unharmed, but several of the less fortunate 
were beaten and incarcerated.  Kilday claimed that rumors of protestor violence justified 
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his use of force, and that he was prepared to use tear gas to keep the peace.  A man of his 
word, Kilday tear gassed 75 strikers outside of another pecan shellery two days later.  
This pattern of picketing, police violence, and arrest continued almost daily for the next 
two weeks.133 
Henderson denounced the police chief’s tactics and insisted that pecan workers 
would not cower before such oppression.  He requested that Governor James Allred 
intervene in the conflict and protect the strikers’ civil rights.  At the same time, pecan 
workers combated Kilday on their own terms.  Although Henderson led the strike, the 
shellers determined each morning which plants they would picket.  In other instances 
they resorted to illegal tactics.  Some strikers knifed the tires of police cars, and those 
who gained access to pecan inventories vandalized shipments, costing operators 
thousands of dollars.  The city’s Tejano workers gladly accepted the CIO’s leadership in 
their struggle but also retained some autonomy in deciding how to combat operators.134 
By the strike’s third week, Allred recognized that the operators, the union, and 
the city had each entrenched themselves to a disconcerting degree.  Chief Kilday 
maintained that no strike existed and that only about five hundred workers had walked 
out.  In addition, he called up 125 firefighters to stand in reserve for his fatigued police 
officers.  Mayor Quin held that the walkout was a local issue, and that he was “not 
interested in discussing the strike with anyone who did not live in San Antonio or was a 
member of the Communist Party.”  Henderson stated that the union would not accept 
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any arbitration scenario that included the city government as either a party or an arbiter, 
and that negotiations could only take place after police violence ended.  He suggested 
the governor send Texas Rangers into San Antonio to ensure the peace.  Southern 
Pecan’s founder, Julius Seligmann, said that he was prepared to relocate his business to 
an area with a more docile labor force, and that the U.S. Labor Department should 
examine rural employers before attacking his business.135 
Allred’s greatest headache came from Washington, D. C., however.  The 
Mexican government contacted the U.S. State Department in regard to sixty-three 
Mexican nationals illegally held in Kilday’s jail.  The State Department, in turn, 
pressured Allred to find a solution to the problem, marking the first time a foreign 
government became involved in an American labor dispute.  With the situation spiraling 
out of control, Allred elected to send Everett Loony, head of the Texas Industrial 
Commission, to San Antonio to investigate charges of civil liberties abuses.  Although 
the investigation fell short of UCAPAWA’s request to replace San Antonio police 
officers with Texas Rangers, it symbolized the governor’s desire to see the shellers 
treated fairly and his willingness to actively pursue an end to the strike.136 
The Looney Commission convened on February 14 and 15 in San Antonio.  On 
the first day, Looney concentrated on questioning city employees and officials.  William 
Christoph, Kilday’s second in command and officer in charge of patrolling the west side,  
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charged that Tenayuca still wielded considerable influence among the city’s Mexican 
population.  He testified that “she has been saying that if the Communists get control 
they are going to destroy the churches and murder the priests like they do in Russia.”  
Similarly, San Antonio’s Police and Fire Commissioner, Phil Wright, defended the use 
of tear gas against picketers, contending that “sometimes we have riots . . . and this tear 
gas, as I understand it, makes a combatant unable to fight.”  The day’s most sensational 
testimony came from San Antonio’s chief of police.  Kilday began by explaining that 
there was “no such thing as peaceful picketing,” and that the pecan shellers’ strike was 
illegitimate because fewer than half of the workers participated.  Looney then questioned 
Kilday about communism.  When pressed to define the doctrine, Kilday responded that 
“a Communist is a person who believes in living in a community on the government and 
tearing down all religion.”  Later in the day, Edwin A. Elliott of the National Labor 
Relations Board refuted Kilday’s testimony.  Elliott explained that according to federal 
law, even a single employee had the right to go on strike without interference from 
municipal authorities.137 
On the second day of testimony, Looney interrogated union leaders and pecan 
company owners.  He started by asking for Henderson’s response to continued red-
baiting, including charges by a representative for the League of Loyal Latin Americans 
who told Looney that he had “irrefutable proof” of Henderson’s communist leanings.  
Henderson explained that “I have never been a communist, and moreover, I believe that 
the communist form of government can never replace our democratic government.”  He 
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further told Looney that many accusations against him stemmed from his participation in 
an organization in 1932 that lobbied on behalf of American businessmen for expanded 
trade with the Soviet Union.138   
At the end of the day, Looney examined Seligmann.  The pecan magnate argued 
that Southern Pecan had only minimal influence over industry wages since, under the 
contract system, it only employed about three hundred shellers directly.  Indirectly, 
however, the company utilized about five thousand pecan shellers during the peak 
season.  Looney asked Seligmann if he adopted the contract system to avoid paying 
Social Security and other payroll taxes.  Seligmann replied that if labor costs in San 
Antonio were any higher he would have to relocate, and suggested that a tariff on 
imported nuts, such as cashews, would allow pecan operators to increase revenue.  
Looney inquired whether that meant a tariff would also increase wages.  Seligmann 
responded, “I don’t know, but it would help the situation,” to which Looney quipped “it 
would help somebody’s situation.”  In the end, city leaders believed the hearing hurt 
their credibility, prompting Kilday to surmise that “it looks like Looney is doing all he 
can to assist the communistic elements.”139 
On February 16 Looney filed his preliminary report with Allred.  He concluded 
that the San Antonio police department violated the civil rights of many strikers.  Mayor 
Quin and others expected the ruling but planned to continue their tactics, as Looney’s 
commission possessed no enforcement mechanism.  The report did change the attitudes 
of the strike’s principals, however.  Seligmann and Henderson both understood that a 
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negotiated end to the walkout would benefit each party and met for several hours on 
February 16 and 17 to discuss arbitration.140 
As the two sides inched toward an agreement, Kilday and his men continued 
harassing picketers.  The local police arrested thirty-two more pecan workers during the 
Looney hearings.  Unlike previous strikers who were arrested for blocking sidewalks, 
law enforcement detained these protestors for carrying signs in public without permits.  
At the same time, the city’s health department, suddenly concerned about the well being 
of west side residents, shut down three soup kitchens that fed picketers each day for 
being unsanitary.  Henderson renewed his request to Allred for Rangers, but the 
governor replied that even though the strikers did “not violate the law . . . I do not have 
the authority to replace the police force with state ‘rangers’.”  Allred then encouraged 
the union to pursue protection for the shellers in court.141 
Henderson took Allred’s advice, and on February 18 Manuel Martinez and Pedro 
Ruiz sought an injunction against Kilday, Commissioner Wright, and Officer Christoph 
in federal district court.  During the first nineteen days of the strike, the San Antonio 
police department arrested 326 striking pecan workers.  The plaintiffs asked the court to 
prevent local authorities from “arresting, molesting, harassing, and interfering” with 
peaceful picketers.  Judge S. G. Tayloe presided over the case, and he demanded that the 
police not act against strikers during the trial.  In accordance with Tayloe’s request, 
Kilday reduced police presence on the west side.142 
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The injunction trial opened on February 22 with Harry Freeman, attorney for the 
plaintiffs, introducing photographs depicting police abuses.  Freeman then called the 
photographer, Cassie Jane Winfree, to the stand.  Winfree worked for the Women’s 
International League for Peace, one of the few groups that supported the strikers.  She 
testified that police officers chased picketers off the streets, used tear gas against women 
and children, and that Kilday told her he could “arrest a Communist any time he cared 
to, and would hold him as long as he wanted to, whether charges were filed or not.”  The 
next day, seventeen Mexican picketers took the stand and related their personal 
experiences with police misconduct.  One woman said that Kilday threatened to 
physically assault her, while others told stories of being chased into their homes, sworn 
at, and beaten.143 
On February 26, Judge Tayloe heard closing arguments, then immediately 
handed down his six-page ruling without taking a recess.  Tayloe explained to the 
stunned attorneys that he awoke at four o’clock that morning and wrote his opinion with 
the idea that he could revise it if anything in the closing arguments changed his mind.  
He ruled that, although the pecan workers had the legal right to strike, “a large number 
of pickets incensed by a spirit of resentment to grievances . . . tends to produce disorder 
and become a menace to the public peace.”  Despite believing that “the average wage of 
these workers is so small as only to provoke pity and compassion,” Tayloe decided that 
public order superseded the shellers’ right to demonstrate.  The pecan workers found 
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little solace in Tayloe’s opinion, although the judge did admonish Kilday and warned 
that the police department was under close scrutiny.144 
Incidents of police violence dramatically declined after the ruling, but scores of 
Tejanos continued to suffer in the city’s overcrowded jails.  From the strike’s onset, 
Kilday’s policy of arresting picketers en masse tested the physical limitations of the San 
Antonio city jail.  Overcrowded cells often held two or three times more picketers than 
their design capacities allowed.  A small group of San Antonio’s most prominent women 
visited the female lockup and were so disgusted that they wrote letters to Mayor Quin, 
Governor Allred, and Representative Maverick.  They witnessed eighteen prostitutes 
forced into a cell designed for six that already held more than a dozen strikers.  The 
visitors claimed that “our local physicians declare that at least ninety percent of these 
prostitutes are suffering from highly infectious venereal disease; when we realize that 
one toilet and one drinking cup had to be shared by women workers and prostitutes 
alike; the full horror of the incident becomes apparent.”  Conditions in the men’s jail 
were no better.  On February 25, the police moved ninety men into a section of the jail 
that already held one hundred and fifty, and had a design capacity of sixty.  The 
prisoners retaliated by making noise, throwing objects, and threatening guards.  Kilday 
ended the quasi riot by turning a fire hose on the inmates.  Relief finally arrived a few 
days later, as the city began releasing picketers once the strike’s end seemed eminent.145 
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The union and the operators spent the last days of February and the first week of 
March verbally sparring with one another in anticipation of final negotiations.  Pressure 
mounted on both parties as Governor Allred, still feeling the State Department’s anger 
regarding the imprisoned Mexican nationals, vowed to exercise the full power of his 
office, if needed, to end the strike.  J. Austin Beasley, appointed by Henderson to lead 
the strike on February 22, announced his intentions to file a grievance with the NLRB 
over Southern Pecan’s disregard of the Wagner Act.  At the same time, he worried about 
maintaining control over the increasingly weary and desperate strikers.  The 
impoverished shellers had not received a paycheck in four weeks, and only their sense of 
unity prevented them from caving to the industry’s terms.  Kilday similarly fretted over 
the emotional state of his overworked officers, and resorted to relieving them with San 
Antonio firefighters.146 
With all sides worn down by more than five weeks of intense conflict, the 
workers and operators agreed to arbitrate on March 9.  The terms of arbitration were 
simple.  The union and the operators each selected one arbiter, and those two selected 
the third.  The workers agreed to return to work at five and six cent wages until the 
hearings concluded, and the city reciprocated by releasing all incarcerated picketers.  
Furthermore, the union agreed to drop its case to the NLRB in exchange for recognition 
of the Pecan Workers Local No. 172 as the shellers’ sole bargaining agent.  With those 
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concessions in place, the pecan workers ended their thirty-seven day walkout and 
awaited the arbitration board’s verdict.147 
* * * * * 
The arbitrators met for several weeks before rendering their decision on April 13.  
They concluded that the union exaggerated poor working conditions, but believed that 
operators could afford to raise wages.  The board ruled that wages of five-and-a-half and 
six-and-a-half cents per pound would take effect on May 1.  These wages were to 
continue until November 1, when the union and operators would sign a longer 
agreement.  Both sides claimed victory after the decision.  In the fall of 1938, the union 
and the operators hammered out terms for the November 1 pact.  The agreement 
included a raise to seven- and eight-cent wages, made pecan shelleries closed shops, 
allowed for automatic deductions of union dues from employee paychecks, and put a 
formal grievance process in place.148 
Before the new contract took effect, however, the federal government dropped a 
bombshell that significantly altered the landscape of American business.  On October 24, 
1938, the Fair Labor Standards Act became law.  The FLSA’s most important provision 
mandated a minimum wage of twenty-five cents an hour.  San Antonio’s pecan 
operators, which paid workers less than ten cents an hour, claimed they could not remain 
solvent paying the minimum wage.  They first tried to persuade the U.S. Department of 
Labor’s Wage and Hour Division that pecan shellers were agricultural workers, and thus 
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exempt from the FLSA.  When this argument failed, Southern Pecan and the rest of San 
Antonio’s operators decided they had no choice but to mechanize their facilities.  They 
requested a three month exemption from the minimum wage while they installed new 
equipment and trained their employees, but again the Wage and Hour Division denied 
their appeal.  One reporter believed these hearings over the training period “degenerated 
into an attempt to convince the principal pecan operator that San Antonio, being part of 
the United States, should pay an American level of wages.”  The CIO, having just 
reached milestone agreements with the operators, joined in efforts to exempt pecan 
workers from the minimum wage.  Northern operators based in St. Louis proved the 
most formidable obstacle to San Antonio’s operators and shellers, however, as they had 
long resented the cheap hand labor that drove down pecan prices across the industry.  
The St. Louis operators mechanized prior to the Depression, and they testified to the 
Wage and Hour Division that their employees made more than twenty-five cents an hour 
even prior to the FLSA.  Moveover, they claimed, employees needed only a few hours of 
training on the shelling machines to become competent.  Seeing no other options, San 
Antonio’s operators shut down over the winter of 1938-39 and installed the equipment 
that would allow them to remain in business while paying the federally mandated 
minimum wage.  The era of hand shelling pecans in San Antonio was over.149 
When the pecan operators closed to mechanize in October 1938, thousands of 
shellers became unemployed.  Churches and civic organizations opened soup kitchens to 
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keep families from starving, but their efforts often proved inadequate.  The local, state, 
and federal governments helped only slightly more.  The City-County Family Welfare 
Agency attempted to feed more than eight thousand families with a staff of six.  
Although most found enough food to survive, the Mexican community desperately 
needed cash to purchase other essential items.  The state of Texas stopped paying 
unemployment benefits in 1936 and provided little relief to laid-off shellers.  The federal 
government tried to provide alternative employment, but Tejanos claimed fewer than 
half of the 1,800 jobs offered to former pecan workers because most could not 
demonstrate American citizenship.  Furthermore, the federal government approved only 
sixty percent of Mexican unemployment claims in 1938, and the average payout was 
twenty dollars over a three to six month period.150 
The pecan operators re-opened their doors in March 1939, and about three 
thousand shellers returned to work.  Those who previously shelled around six pounds of 
pecans per day by hand could shell more than thirty pounds per day using the new 
machines.  The equipment eliminated nine thousand jobs, although the standard of living 
improved for those who remained employed.  Operators tired of constantly training new 
employees, so the work became less seasonal.  Working conditions steadily improved, as 
did wages.  At the same time, however, the number of pecan workers dwindled, and by 
1941 Southern Pecan needed only six hundred shellers.  In the mid-1940s only a few 
hundred pecan workers remained in San Antonio.  National and regional CIO leaders 
focused their efforts elsewhere, and their inattention to the Pecan Workers Local No. 172 
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allowed the chapter president and secretary to embezzle the entire treasury.  Unable to 
raise enough interest to rejuvenate the union, the CIO pronounced it defunct in 1948.  By 
that time, the pecan shellers’ strike was a distant memory.151 
* * * * * 
In the past twenty-five years, scholars have developed explanations for the 
emergence of group actions that reveal a multitude of factors responsible for events such 
as the pecan shellers’ strike.  Sociologists, in particular, have developed useful 
frameworks that reveal the powerful coupling of grass-root solidarity formation and a 
favorable political climate, as well as key roles played by external allies who lend 
important resources to challengers.  Historians researching the pecan shellers’ strike 
have typically characterized it as a spontaneous reaction to the industry-mandated pay 
cut, but evidence suggests that the work stoppage had antecedents reaching back decades 
into San Antonio’s history.  The city’s pecan workers had legitimate complaints about 
conditions in both their workplaces and their neighborhoods.  They forged unity 
internally, but also received substantial support from outsiders, such as Maury Maverick 
and the CIO.  Moreover, the shellers benefited from the public’s acceptance of 
politicians who protected the rights of labor.  On the surface, the shellers’ victory seems 
miraculous because of its spontaneity.  A deeper look reveals the convergence of 
poverty, solidarity, and opportunity that accounted for the strike’s timing and its 
success.152
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
Just weeks after taking office as Mayor of San Antonio in the summer of 1939, 
Maury Maverick received a seemingly routine inquiry from a member of his 
constituency.  “The Communist Party requests the use of the East Wing of the city 
auditorium for Friday August 25,” Emma Tenayuca wrote.  One year earlier, Mayor 
Charles Quin had received a similar request from visiting labor leader Vincent 
Lombardo Toledano.  Quin, by then a seasoned red-baiter, responded that “Toledano is a 
communist, and there will be no city property available for him.”  Unlike Quin, 
Maverick fancied himself a champion of civil liberties, particularly freedom of speech.  
He believed that the Communist Party had a constitutional right to use the municipal 
auditorium and granted its wish for the East Wing.  On the night of August 25, about 
seventy-five members met at the appointed time on city property.  Word of the gathering 
spread quickly, and before the group adjourned a mob of 8,000 formed outside the 
auditorium.  The heterogeneous group of protestors was led by a Catholic priest, the 
Jewish commander-elect of the local American Legion post, a Klansman, and a former 
Republican gubernatorial candidate.  After rousing the crowd with speeches and hanging 
Mayor Maverick in effigy, the mob stormed the auditorium.  They destroyed the 
building’s interior but failed to capture any of the communists, all of whom escaped out 
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a back door moments earlier.  Although physical injuries were minor, the damage done 
to both Tenayuca and Maverick’s reputations proved irreversible.153 
The fallout from the riot lasted years.  Tenayuca, exasperated with a local 
populous that alternately sought her help and attacked her beliefs, left San Antonio 
within days.  She spent time in Houston before moving to the San Francisco area, where 
she enrolled in college and earned a degree in education.  Tenayuca returned to San 
Antonio in the late 1960s and taught elementary school until retiring in 1982.  She never 
resumed her role as a labor organizer.  Maverick, elected mayor just three months before 
the riot, completed his term and ran, once again, against People’s Ticket candidate 
Charles Quin in 1941.  Despite changing business-as-usual in city hall, Maverick’s 
decision to allow the Communist Party to meet on city property haunted him during the 
race.  His mantra of free speech fell on deaf ears, and organizations as diverse as the 
Catholic Church, the Elks Club, the Ku Klux Klan, and, most personally disappointing, 
veterans groups opposed him.  Even with continued support from the west side, 
Maverick lost a close election to Quin.  Only months later, the U.S. entered World War 
II, and the former politician found work with President Franklin Roosevelt’s 
administration assisting with the war effort.  After the war, Maverick returned to San 
Antonio and opened a private law practice.  He never ran for public office again.154 
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The riot that occurred in August 1939 illustrates the thin line upon which the 
pecan shellers’ strike balanced the previous year.  San Antonians had come to believe in 
expanded workers’ right but were wary of supporting communism.  The shellers and 
their leadership managed to walk that line well enough to wear down the city’s operators 
and leave a legacy that, while mixed, was greater than any of its principals.  To begin, 
working conditions improved for pecan shellers.  The state government instituted rules 
in late 1940 that mandated shelleries have solid floors, adequate ventilation and lighting, 
screened doors and windows, and hot and cold running water.  Perhaps more 
importantly, the strike demonstrated to both Mexicans and Anglos, and both labor and 
capital, the power that laid within the barrio.  By 1945 the west side played a pivotal role 
in municipal elections, and local politicians could no longer afford to ignore Mexican 
voters.  Moreover, the shellers’ strike punctuated years of labor strife on the west side, 
and some have suggested that such unrest prepared Tejanos for and anticipated civil 
rights movements in later decades.155   
Yet, gains in civil rights did not translate into gains for labor.  In 1965, while 
organized labor in the U.S. at-large reached a peak, unions in San Antonio remained 
weak.  Fewer than ten percent of the city’s workers belonged to a union, the least of any 
major city in a right-to-work state.  In later years, the events that immediately followed 
the strike, particularly the lost jobs and untimely demise of both Tenayuca and 
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Maverick’s public careers, overshadowed the workers’ hard-earned victory.  Some of the 
strike’s participants even considered the walkout a failure years after it ended.156 
Regardless of the strike’s aftermath, the circumstances that led to the work 
stoppage deserve examination.  When operators chose to reduce wages for shellers in 
early 1938, they underestimated their employees’ ability to fight back.  Yet, the 
operators were not uninformed, nor did their past experiences lead them to believe the 
shellers could sustain a strike for more than five weeks.  After all, previous strikes had 
been undermined by co-opting union leadership, and it seemed clear that the Mexican 
workers, living in abject poverty, could ill afford to miss a payday.  Operators believed 
they had little to fear from shellers, but processes outside their field of view and beyond 
their control conspired to form a nearly ideal situation for the pecan workers to strike. 
The shellers’ poverty resulted from rampant discrimination in and around San 
Antonio during the first four decades of the twentieth century.  Political turmoil in 
Mexico provided Texas’s farmers with an inexpensive, seemingly inexhaustible labor 
force.  Those workers took little interest in domestic affairs, as most expected to return 
to their home country someday, and lacked the tradition of representative government 
fundamental in forming American notions of civic duty.  Moreover, poll taxes, white 
primaries, and an inability to demonstrate American citizenship disfranchised most 
Tejanos.  Unable to protect their interests with the ballot, Mexicans in San Antonio fell  
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victim to a dual labor market that devalued their work and trapped them in low-paying 
occupations.  Low wages forced Mexicans to live in poorly constructed shacks in areas 
of town that lacked water, sewage, electricity, and paved streets.  Airborne diseases such 
as tuberculosis thrived in homes and workplaces that offered poor ventilation and 
decimated the city’s Tejano population.  Substandard educations in segregated schools 
further ensnared west side residents.  By all measures, Mexicans in San Antonio 
struggled just to survive. 
The poverty endured by shellers gave them reason to resent and distrust the city’s 
establishment, but it was far from crippling.  West side residents used existing 
institutions, including the Catholic Church and mutualistas, to develop leadership and 
organizational skills, then used those tools to create advocacy groups.  Those groups 
complimented cultural and social activities that constituted the foundation of solidarity 
formation in the community.  By the mid-1930s, Tejanas on the west side carried that 
unity with them into the city’s garment factories, cigar-rolling plants, and pecan 
shelleries.  Solidarity allowed shellers to overcome poverty during the strike, as they 
drew support from other Mexican workers when nearly everyone else had abandoned 
them. 
Nevertheless, that solidarity would have eventually run dry if not for help from 
external allies.  Tenayuca played a key role in organizing and energizing the pecan 
shellers, but the liabilities created by her communist reputation threatened to suffocate 
the strike in its early stages.  Demonstrating uncommon selflessness, she stepped aside 
and allowed Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) representatives to assume 
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ideological stances that seemed moderate relative to her more “radical” agenda.  The 
CIO provided shellers with experienced leaders, increased publicity, and tangible 
resources that allowed them to prolong the walkout.  Once the strike ended, moreover, 
battle-tested CIO negotiators probably secured better settlement terms for the shellers 
than they would have secured for themselves.  The shellers may have achieved victory 
even without the CIO, but the union’s involvement likely shortened the conflict and 
resulted in a more attractive outcome. 
While poverty-induced frustrations, webs of solidarity, and external allies help 
explain the strike’s conclusion, the political climate that emerged in San Antonio by 
1938 accounted for the strike’s timing than any other factor.  The Great Depression 
forced Americans to reassess the government’s responsibility in alleviating wide-scale 
financial hardship caused by economic catastrophe.  In 1932, San Antonians joined the 
majority of Americans in electing Franklin Roosevelt, a move that signaled a significant 
change in the public’s expectations of government.  In Texas, as in the rest of the South, 
that shift in attitude was more reflective of Anglo thought than of Mexican thought, 
simply because Anglos constituted an overwhelming majority of the electorate.  For the 
remainder of the decade, San Antonians consistently selected public officials at the 
federal and state levels who supported labor rights and, to a smaller degree, rights for 
Tejanos.  The city’s political machine subverted democracy by creating non-competitive 
elections, but Maury Maverick managed to topple the People’s Ticket, at least 
temporarily.  By all indications, the public will as reflected in election results suggested 
that San Antonians would be tolerant of, if not sympathetic toward, a shellers’ strike. 
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Without poverty, solidarity, and opportunity, the pecan shellers would not likely 
have struck against the city’s operators in January of 1938, and if they had the outcome 
might have been quite different.  Indeed, a similar strike waged today would almost 
undoubtedly fail.  Although poverty remains a problem in the U.S., particularly for 
minority groups and single mothers, the economy’s generally good health for the past 
three decades has stigmatized those who have failed to prosper.  If an economic calamity 
on the scale of the Great Depression occurred now, Americans would likely reevaluate 
the causes of poverty and become more aware of the manifold reasons why individuals 
struggle financially.  Until then, poverty will continue to carry connotations of laziness, 
low intelligence, and irresponsibility.  Solidarity on the scale pecan workers developed is 
also currently in short supply.  Scholar Robert Putnam’s recent work on the American 
trend of foregoing membership in traditional civic, interest, and hobbyist groups in favor 
of individualized activities highlights one major obstacle to solidarity formation.157  
Specifically, Americans now participate in fewer social activities that strengthen ties 
between neighbors who do not work together.  Because most people now live in 
communities of strangers, they cannot rely on each other for support during financially 
trying times, such as the midst of a strike.   
Similarly, the political environment, particularly attitudes toward labor, is much 
different now than during the 1930s.  The percentage of Americans working non-
governmental jobs who belong to a union hovers in the single digits with no signs of 
increasing, and many fail to see the necessity of paying union dues since the federal 
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government has passed laws designed to protect workers physically and fiscally.  
Furthermore, union membership is often considered a political statement, as one of the 
country’s two major parties now insists that unions are antiquated while the other takes 
labor’s vote, and campaign contributions, for granted.  Favorable political conditions for 
labor militancy may someday return to the U.S., particularly in the wake of an economic 
downturn on the scale of the Great Depression.  If they do, workers spurred by legitimate 
grievances who have firmly-anchored webs of solidarity formed inside and outside of 
the workplace will have the best opportunities to challenge their employers. 
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